Writ Jurisdiction Under Article 227 Cannot Be Invoked to Challenge Interlocutory Arbitral Orders Declining Additional Evidence

The Petitioner challenged an interlocutory order dated 17.02.2026 passed by an Arbitral Tribunal under the MSMED Act, which rejected the Petitioner's application to bring additional documents and an additional affidavit of evidence on record.

The application was moved on 12.02.2026, after the Respondent’s evidence had concluded and the matter was set for cross-examination of the Petitioner’s witness.

The Petitioner contended that the documents were necessary for adjudication and had been omitted earlier due to inadvertence or technical difficulties.

The Tribunal dismissed the application, noting that the documents were in the Petitioner's possession during the pleading stage and that allowing them at a belated stage would de novo the trial and protract proceedings.

1. Whether the High Court should exercise its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to interfere with an interlocutory order passed by an Arbitral Tribunal during the pendency of proceedings.

The court emphasized the principle of minimal judicial interference in arbitral proceedings as mandated by the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

In S.B.P. & Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd., it was held that parties must wait for the final award to challenge intermediate orders unless a right of appeal exists under Section 37.

The "razor-thin" scope of Article 227 in arbitration was defined by Deep Industries Ltd. v. ONGC, restricting interference to orders "patently lacking in inherent jurisdiction".

Surender Kumar Singhal v. Arun Kumar Bhalotia requires "exceptional circumstances" or "patent perversity" for court intervention.

Procedural rules from Order VII Rule 14 and Order VIII Rule 1A of the CPC were noted as aids to justice.

The Court reasoned that Article 227 does not provide a mandate for "casually" entertaining writs against interlocutory orders, as arbitration is a private adjudicatory system chosen to bypass traditional litigation delays.

Upon reviewing the facts, the Court found that the Petitioner’s application was filed at a significantly belated stage—after the claimant's evidence was closed and during the Petitioner’s own witness cross-examination.

The Court agreed with the Tribunal that the documents were already in the Petitioner's possession during the pleading stage, and no satisfactory explanation was provided for the delay.

Applying the standard of "patent perversity," the Court found the Tribunal’s order to be reasoned and aimed at preventing the reopening of the trial, thereby failing to meet the high threshold required for constitutional interference.

The Court dismissed the writ petition, clarifying that the Petitioner remains at liberty to challenge the interlocutory order under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, once the final award is passed.