Writ jurisdiction was declined where an efficacious alternative remedy existed and no useful purpose remained.

The petitioner, Smt. Bina Gendre, was the Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat Dhaba, District Durg.

The Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), Dhamdha, passed an order dated 22 September 2022 removing her from the office of Sarpanch and disqualifying her for six years under Section 40(2) of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993.

Her appeal against that order was dismissed by the Collector, Durg, by order dated 5 January 2023.

The petitioner challenged both orders under Article 226 of the Constitution, contending that the appellate authority had not independently considered the grounds raised in the appeal and had dismissed it mechanically.

The State opposed the writ petition on the ground that an efficacious alternative remedy was available.

By the time of hearing, the petitioner’s tenure as Sarpanch had expired, approximately two and a half years of the six-year disqualification period had elapsed, and the next election was stated to be scheduled for 2030.

Whether the High Court should exercise its writ jurisdiction to examine the orders removing the petitioner from the office of Sarpanch and disqualifying her for six years when an efficacious alternative remedy was available.

Whether, in view of the expiry of the petitioner’s tenure and the passage of a substantial part of the disqualification period, any useful purpose would be served by examining the merits of the impugned orders in writ jurisdiction.

Section 40(2) of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993 authorises removal from the office of Sarpanch and consequential disqualification for the prescribed period.

The High Court applied the established principle governing writ jurisdiction that a writ petition ordinarily should not be entertained where the aggrieved party has an efficacious alternative statutory remedy, particularly when no exceptional circumstance requiring immediate interference is shown.

The Court also applied the principle that writ relief is discretionary and may be declined where adjudication would serve no practical or useful purpose because of intervening circumstances.

The petitioner alleged that the appellate authority had failed to address the specific grounds raised in the appeal and had dismissed it without cogent findings.

However, the Court did not examine the merits of that contention because the petitioner had an efficacious alternative remedy under law.

The Court further noted that the petitioner’s tenure as Sarpanch had already ended, approximately two and a half years of the six-year disqualification period had elapsed, and the next election was not expected until 2030.

In these circumstances, the Court concluded that examining the validity of the impugned orders in writ jurisdiction would serve no useful purpose.

The petitioner was left at liberty to avail the appropriate statutory remedy in accordance with law, and the competent authority was directed to consider any such remedy on its own merits and in accordance with law.

No order as to costs was made.