Writ Petition Challenging Allotment Delay of 27 Years Dismissed for Unexplained Laches and Stale Claims

In 1991, the Town Improvement Trust, Damoh, issued an advertisement for the allotment of MIG Plot No. 29 under the Rashtriya Awas Bank Yojana.

The petitioner was selected, deposited the required amount of Rs. 40,500/-, and a lease deed was subsequently executed in his favor on July 31, 1996.

Despite completing all formalities, the petitioner was not handed possession of the plot for 27 years.

The petitioner filed various representations to the authorities, which went unheeded.

Consequently, the petitioner filed this writ petition on August 20, 2025, seeking a mandamus for delivery of possession and a direction to decide his pending representation.

1. Whether a writ petition seeking enforcement of rights under an allotment can be entertained after a delay of nearly 29 years without a plausible explanation.

2. Whether the court should exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in favor of a "sleeping litigant" regarding stale claims.

The court applied the equitable doctrine of "delay and laches," establishing that discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be extended to litigants who sleep over their rights.

Relied on Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd. vs K. Thangappan (2006), which emphasizes that High Courts may refuse extraordinary powers if negligence or omission to assert rights causes prejudice to the opposite party.

Cited S.S. Balu vs State of Kerala (2009) and NDMC v. Pan Singh (2007) for the principle that "delay defeats equity" and that stale claims should not be entertained even if the petitioner is similarly situated to others who received relief.

Referenced State of Orissa vs Mamata Mohanty (2011), noting that a litigant cannot "wake up from deep slumber" and seek impetus from other judgments after a long lapse of time.

The court observed that while the allotment process and lease deed execution were completed by July 1996, the petitioner remained inactive for nearly three decades before approaching the Court in 2025.

Although the petitioner claimed there was no delay, the court found this assertion unsubstantiated as the records indicated the proceedings originated in 1991.

The court reasoned that the petitioner failed to provide any "plausible explanation" for the significant time gap.

Applying the cited precedents, the court determined that the petitioner was a "sleeping litigant".

The court concluded that exercising equitable jurisdiction in such a case would be improper, as the extraordinary power of the writ court is reserved for diligent parties and not for the enforcement of stale claims that have lost their relevance through negligence and the passage of time.

The court held that the petitioner is not entitled to any discretionary relief or mandamus because he slept over his rights for 27 years following the execution of the lease deed.

No order as to costs was made.