### Writ Petition Challenging Section 248 MPLRC Order Barred by Availability of Statutory Alternative Remedy

The petitioner challenged an order dated 13.03.2026 passed by the Tehsildar, Dharampuri, under Section 248 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959, which ordered his dispossession.

Previously, in W.P. No. 38269/2025, the High Court had directed the Tehsildar to conduct proceedings in accordance with the law and afford the petitioner a hearing.

The Tehsildar granted multiple adjournments for the petitioner to lead evidence (09.02.2026, 23.02.2026, 27.02.2026, and 09.03.2026).

On 13.03.2026, the petitioner filed an application for amended replies and documents instead of adducing evidence; the Tehsildar rejected this application as a delay tactic and passed the final dispossession order.

1. Whether the Writ Petition is maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution despite the availability of an alternative statutory remedy under Section 44(1) of the M.P. Land Revenue Code.

2. Whether the impugned order was passed in gross violation of the principles of natural justice and procedural rules.

Section 44(1) of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959, which provides a statutory right of appeal against the orders of a Tehsildar.

Doctrine of "Alternative Remedy" and the exceptions established in Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai (1998) 8 SCC 1, which allow writ jurisdiction despite an alternative remedy if there is a violation of natural justice, lack of jurisdiction, or enforcement of fundamental rights.

Procedural framework of the Madhya Pradesh Bhu Rajaswa Sanhita (Rajaswa Nyayalayon Ki Prakriya) Niyam, 2019.

The court found that the petitioner had been afforded ample opportunity to present evidence across several dates, which indicated that the principles of natural justice were not violated and the previous court directions were followed.

The court reasoned that the Tehsildar's refusal to grant further time on 13.03.2026 was a reasoned decision, and whether such an opportunity was "adequate" is a question of fact better suited for an appellate authority.

The court determined that the case did not meet the exceptional criteria set out in Whirlpool Corporation to bypass the statutory appeal process, as the impugned order was not "wholly without jurisdiction".

The court granted the petitioner liberty to file an appeal and a stay application within 10 days, ordering that the dispossession remain in abeyance until the appellate authority considers the stay application.