Writ Petition Disposed With Liberty to Seek Alternative Remedy Before Principal Secretary Under Rule 32(vii)

The petitioner, a Public Distribution System (PDS) licensee (Licence No. 02/1992), challenged the cancellation of his license by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Rajauli, via an order dated 15.06.2017

The petitioner’s appeal against this cancellation was rejected by the Collector, Nawada, on 04.04.2018, and a subsequent revision petition was dismissed by the Commissioner, Magadh Division, Gaya, on 07.03.2022

The petitioner approached the High Court seeking a writ of certiorari to quash these orders, alleging they were based on vague and unsubstantiated allegations without reasoned explanations

Whether the petitioner has an alternative and effective statutory remedy available under the Bihar Targeted Public Distribution System (Control) Order, 2016, to challenge the concurrent findings of the lower authorities

Rule 32 (vii) of the Bihar Targeted Public Distribution System (Control) Order, 2016

This rule empowers the Principal Secretary or Secretary of the Department to call for records and review orders passed by the Divisional Commissioner, District Officer, or Licensing Authority, either suo moto or upon representation. The Secretary may intervene if the subordinate authority exercised powers not entrusted to them, acted illegally without considering facts, or failed to exercise their powers properly

The Court did not adjudicate upon the merits or demerits of the cancellation order. Instead, it focused on the procedural aspect of "alternative remedy."

Upon reviewing Rule 32 (vii) of the 2016 Order, the Court found that the petitioner possesses an effective administrative remedy by way of a representation to the Principal Secretary/Secretary of the Food and Civil Supply Department.

The Court reasoned that since the statutory framework provides a specific hierarchy for redressal against the orders of the Revisional/Appellate Authority, the petitioner should exhaust that remedy before seeking extraordinary writ jurisdiction.

To ensure justice, the Court directed that any delay in filing such representation should be viewed liberally as the petitioner was pursuing the matter before the High Court.

The Principal Secretary was directed to hear the petitioner, provide a notice of hearing, and pass a reasoned order strictly in accordance with law within three months. The Court held that the limitation period for this representation should be construed liberally given the pending litigation.