Writ petition is maintainable against a minority aided school for dismissal involving breach of statutory service regulations.

The petitioner was appointed as an Assistant Teacher at Plus 2 Arya Kanya Uchaya Vidyalaya (Respondent No. 7), a minority-aided school, in 1987.

Due to internal disputes within the School’s Managing Committee, the petitioner was suspended on April 5, 2024, and subsequently dismissed from service on January 10, 2026, during the pendency of the writ petition.

The petitioner challenged these orders on the ground that they were passed without the mandatory approval of the Director (Secondary Education), as required under Section 18(3)(d) of the Bihar Non-Government Secondary Schools (Taking over of Management and Control) Act, 1981, as amended in 2011.

The Respondent School raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the writ petition, arguing it arose from an ordinary contract of service.

The Court applied the principles from Andi Mukta Sadguru v. V.R. Rudani, holding that Article 226 is not confined to statutory authorities but covers any person or body performing a "public duty".

It relied on Marwari Balika Vidyalaya v. Asha Srivastava, which established that a writ is maintainable against a private school if the removal of a teacher requires government approval.

It further integrated the "twin test" from St. Mary’s Education Society v. Rajendra Prasad Bhargava: for a writ to lie in service matters of private institutions, the action must have a "public law element" or the service conditions must be regulated by statutory provisions.

The court referred to the Bihar Non-Government Secondary Schools Act, 1981, which mandates regulatory and disciplinary control by the State over minority-aided schools.

The Court reasoned that while a pure breach of contract in a private institution does not merit a writ, an exception exists where the service condition is governed by statute.

The Respondent School is an "aided" minority institution discharging the public function of education and is subject to the regulatory framework of the 1981 Act.

The petitioner’s challenge was specifically founded on the alleged violation of Section 18(3)(d) of the Act, which requires prior approval from competent State authorities for dismissal.

The Court found that because the challenge involved a "breach of law" rather than a mere "breach of contract," it possessed a public law element, thereby distinguishing it from cases involving purely private administrative matters.

It ruled that since the actions were assailed for violating statutory provisions of the 1981 Act (as amended in 2011), the dispute was amenable to judicial review under Article 226.

The Court ordered the matter to be heard on its merits, limiting the petitioner’s future arguments strictly to the alleged breach of statutory provisions.

The case was posted for July 20, 2026, for disposal of the interlocutory application regarding dismissal.