Writ Petition is Premature During Pendency of Statutory Appeal Raising Similar Grounds

Following a search and seizure operation on 08.01.2021 under Section 132 of the Income Tax Act, the Assessing Officer passed an order on 25.03.2022 treating Rs. 11,65,000/- as unexplained money under Section 69A.

The petitioner appealed to the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), who dismissed the appeal ex-parte on 24.01.2024 after five notices went unanswered.

The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) subsequently set aside this dismissal on 07.03.2025 and remanded the matter back to the Appellate Authority to allow the petitioner a fresh hearing.

While the remanded appeal was pending, the petitioner filed this writ petition challenging the validity of the original 2021 search warrant and expressing apprehension that additional grounds of appeal would not be considered.

1. Whether a writ petition under Article 226 is maintainable during the pendency of a statutory appeal involving the same subject matter.

2. Whether the petitioner’s apprehension regarding the non-consideration of additional grounds by the Appellate Authority justifies judicial intervention at a preliminary stage.

Section 250(5) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, which empowers the Appellate Authority to admit additional grounds of appeal if the omission was not willful.

The jurisdictional principle established in Bombay Metropolitan Region Development Authority v. Gokak Patel Volkart Ltd and Others (1995), which mandates that a writ petition is not maintainable when a statutory appeal is pending and the raised grounds can be addressed by the statutory authority.

The availability of a further statutory remedy under Section 253 of the Act (Appellate Tribunal).

The Court reasoned that the petitioner was attempting to "open a second front of attack" by pursuing a parallel writ proceeding while the statutory appeal was still active.

Regarding the petitioner's fear that additional grounds would be ignored, the Court found this apprehension "premature and misconceived" because Section 250(5) specifically provides a mechanism for the Appellate Authority to hear such grounds.

The Court emphasized that Article 226 should not be used to bypass the hierarchy of statutory remedies, especially when the petitioner has already invoked the appellate process.

The Court concluded that since the matter was already remanded for a fresh hearing by the ITAT, the petitioner must seek relief through that channel rather than through extraordinary jurisdiction.

The petition was dismissed; however, the Court granted liberty to the petitioner to challenge the new ex-parte order passed during the pendency of the writ before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal under Section 253 of the Act.