Written order under Section 130 BNSS is a jurisdictional prerequisite for initiating proceedings under Section 126.

The Petitioners challenged various show-cause notices issued by Deputy Collectors and Sub-Divisional Magistrates (SDMs) across Goa under Section 126 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS).

The notices called upon the Petitioners to execute bonds for keeping the peace.

The Petitioners contended that the Magistrates initiated these proceedings mechanically via "cyclostyled" forms without passing a mandatory written order under Section 130 of the BNSS or recording the substance of the information received.

They argued that the failure to record a reasoned opinion regarding the sufficiency of grounds for proceeding rendered the notices jurisdictionally defective.

1. Whether the passing of a written order under Section 130 of the BNSS is a mandatory prerequisite (sine qua non) for an Executive Magistrate to assume jurisdiction under Section 126.

2. Whether a mechanical or cyclostyled show-cause notice issued under Section 126 can be legally construed as a valid order under Section 130.

Section 126 provides the power to require security for keeping the peace when a Magistrate is of the "opinion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding".

Section 130 mandates that a Magistrate acting under Section 126 "shall make an order in writing, setting forth the substance of the information received," the bond amount, and the term.

The court relied on the principle that when a statute requires an act to be done in a particular manner, it must be done in that manner and no other.

It further applied precedents including Jitendra R. Deshprabhu Vs. Executive Magistrate (1992) and Rajesh Suryabhan Nayak Vs. State of Maharashtra (2006), which established that preventive justice proceedings require independent application of mind and the setting forth of the substance of information to protect personal liberty.

The court found that the impugned notices were "practically cyclostyled," with identical contents across different cases, differing only in the names and signatures of the Magistrates.

This indicated a lack of individual application of mind to the specific facts of each case.

The court reasoned that Section 130 is not a mere formality; it is the jurisdictional basis for proceedings under Section 126, as evidenced by Sections 131 and 133, which require the order to be read over to the person or accompany the summons.

The court rejected the State's argument that the notices themselves could be treated as Section 130 orders, holding that the Magistrate must record an objective "opinion" and the "substance of information" to justify infringing upon a citizen's liberty.

Failure to follow this statutory sequence constitutes a jurisdictional error.

It held that an order under Section 130 is an essential prerequisite for proceeding under Section 126 and that a show-cause notice cannot be substituted for such an order.

The court directed Executive Magistrates to strictly comply with the requirements of Section 130 by passing reasoned written orders that reflect the substance of the information received.