Written order under Section 130 BNSS is a mandatory prerequisite for assuming jurisdiction under Section 126.

Several petitioners approached the High Court challenging show-cause notices issued by various Deputy Collectors and Sub-Divisional Magistrates (SDMs) across Goa under Section 126 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS).

The Magistrates had initiated these preventive proceedings to require the petitioners to execute bonds for keeping the peace.

The petitioners contended that the Magistrates issued these notices mechanically using cyclostyled forms without passing a preliminary written order as required by Section 130 of the BNSS.

They argued that the failure to record a reasoned opinion or set forth the substance of information received rendered the proceedings jurisdictionaly flawed.

1. Whether the passing of a written order under Section 130 of the BNSS, setting forth the substance of information received, is a mandatory condition precedent for exercising jurisdiction under Section 126 of the BNSS.

2. Whether a show-cause notice issued under Section 126 of the BNSS can be legally construed as a substitute for the mandatory written order required under Section 130.

The Court primarily applied Section 126 of the BNSS (Security for keeping peace) and Section 130 of the BNSS (Requirement of a written order).

It relied on the principle that when a statute requires an act to be done in a particular manner, it must be done in that manner or not at all.

The Court followed the precedents established in Jitendra R. Deshprabhu v. Executive Magistrate (1992), which held that the Magistrate must reach an opinion on sufficient grounds before proceeding.

The Court followed Rajesh s/o Suryabhan Nayak v. State of Maharashtra (2006), which condemned the use of printed/cyclostyled orders in preventive proceedings as a lack of application of mind.

The Court observed that Section 126(1) of the BNSS empowers a Magistrate to act only when they are of the "opinion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding".

This power is restricted by Section 130, which mandates a written order setting forth the "substance of the information received," the bond amount, and the term of force.

The Court reasoned that this order is sine qua non for assuming jurisdiction because, under Sections 131 and 133, this specific order must be read over to the person or accompany the summons.

In the present cases, the Court found the impugned notices to be "practically cyclostyled," with identical contents and no specific reflection of the information received or the Magistrate's independent judicial satisfaction.

The Court emphasized that since these proceedings affect personal liberty, strict compliance with the statutory procedure is mandatory and cannot be reduced to a "mere formality" or a mechanical exercise.

It clarified that a notice issued under Section 126 cannot be treated as a valid order under Section 130.

Consequently, the Court quashed and set aside the impugned notices and all subsequent proceedings initiated against the petitioners.

The Rule was made absolute in all six writ petitions, directing the Magistrates to strictly follow the statutory scheme and avoid mechanical, cyclostyled orders in the future.