A 10% cap on MMGS-II placement is valid; threshold marks create no vested entitlement.

The respondents were Trainee Officers of the 2019 batch, promoted from the post of Assistant under the State Bank of India Officers’ Service Rules, 1992 and the Training and Confirmation Policy dated 23 April 2019 (“Old Policy”).

Under Clause 5G(i) of the Old Policy, officers securing at least 50% marks, or 45% for SC/ST/PwD candidates, were to be confirmed in JMGS-I; under Clause 5G(ii), officers securing at least 75%, or 70% for SC/ST candidates, were to be “considered for placement” in MMGS-II.

While the respondents’ training and assessments were pending, the Bank issued the revised policy dated 16 December 2020 (“Impugned Policy”), capping placement in MMGS-II at the top 10% of the batch on an all-India merit basis.

The respondents challenged the revised policy before the learned Single Judge, who held it arbitrary and invalid insofar as it applied to the 2019 batch, and directed placement of eligible respondents in MMGS-II with notional benefits.

The Bank preferred the present intra-Court appeal.

1. Whether the Impugned Policy capping MMGS-II placement at 10% of the batch was ultra vires Rules 15 and 16 of the State Bank of India Officers’ Service Rules, 1992.

2. Whether application of the Impugned Policy to the 2019 batch impermissibly changed the “rules of the game” midway through the respondents’ training and assessment.

3. Whether the Old Policy vested in officers securing 75%, or 70% for SC/ST candidates, an enforceable right to placement or fitment in MMGS-II.

4. Whether applying the Impugned Policy to the 2019 batch, while the 2018 batch had received MMGS-II placement under the Old Policy, amounted to hostile discrimination.

5. Whether the Impugned Policy operated retrospectively so as to adversely affect the respondents’ rights.

The Court applied Section 43(1) of the State Bank of India Act, 1955, under which the Bank’s Central Board framed the State Bank of India Officers’ Service Rules, 1992.

Rules 15 and 16 govern probation and confirmation: satisfactory completion of training gives rise to confirmation in service, while the first proviso to Rule 16(1) confers discretion on the Bank to grant placement or fitment in MMGS-II based on merit and suitability for a future leadership role, through a screening process prescribed by the Central Human Resources Committee.

The Old Policy therefore created an enforceable right to confirmation in JMGS-I upon satisfaction of the prescribed minimum marks under Clause 5G(i), but only a right to consideration—not automatic placement—in MMGS-II under Clause 5G(ii).

The Court relied on State of U.P. v. Akbar Ali Khan, which recognises that confirmation may become substantive where the governing appointment terms so provide.

Divisional Personnel Officer, Southern Railway v. T.R. Chellappan, explaining that “consideration” requires active application of mind but does not mandate a particular result.

State of Haryana v. Subhash Chander Marwaha, permitting restriction of appointments to higher-ranked candidates despite available vacancies.

The Court distinguished Tej Prakash Pathak v. Rajasthan High Court and Minakshi Singh v. State of M.P., which concern impermissible alteration of eligibility or examination criteria during an ongoing selection or assessment process.

The Court distinguished the respondents’ vested right to confirmation from their contingent right to MMGS-II placement.

Since the respondents remained entitled to confirmation in JMGS-I upon achieving the prescribed minimum marks, the Impugned Policy did not alter their statutory right under Rule 16 or the confirmation criterion under Clause 5G(i).

The 75% threshold under Clause 5G(ii) merely placed an officer within the zone of consideration; the words “shall be considered,” contrasted with “shall be confirmed,” did not create automatic entitlement to MMGS-II placement.

The 10% cap was treated as an objective method of exercising the Bank’s pre-existing discretion concerning merit and suitability for future leadership roles, based on the Bank’s experience that extensive MMGS-II placement had resulted in insufficiently experienced officers occupying middle-management positions.

The policy was introduced before completion of the respondents’ final assessments and was applied to the entire 2019 batch, while the 2018 Trainee Officers had already completed assessment and received placement; this constituted a rational basis for distinguishing the batches and did not amount to hostile discrimination.

Consequently, the Court held that there was no impermissible mid-course alteration of the selection or confirmation criteria and no retrospective deprivation of a vested right.

The Court held that the Impugned Policy was consistent with the 1992 Rules, did not change the rules of the game midway, was not retrospective, and did not discriminate against the 2019 batch.

The respondents had an enforceable right to confirmation in JMGS-I upon meeting the minimum qualifying marks, but only a right to be considered—not an automatic right—to placement in MMGS-II.

The judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 14 November 2024 was set aside, the writ petition was dismissed, and no order as to costs was made.