A 20-year life sentence requires actual incarceration; accrued remission does not entitle the convict to release.

The petitioner was convicted by the Special TADA Court, Ahmedabad, for offences under Sections 34 and 120B of the IPC and sentenced to life imprisonment quantified at 20 years by judgment dated 6 February 2007.

His appeal before the Supreme Court was dismissed on 18 November 2009.

After undergoing more than 18 years of incarceration, the petitioner challenged the rejection of his remission claim.

The High Court had earlier directed the authorities to reconsider his case, but the State again rejected remission by order dated 30 October 2024.

The petitioner relied on an RTI response indicating that 802 days of remission had accrued to his account and argued that, when added to his period of incarceration, he had completed the 20-year sentence.

The State opposed the petition on the grounds that remission was discretionary, the petitioner had repeatedly absconded while released on parole or temporary release, and the Jail Advisory Committee had unanimously recommended against his premature release.

The jail record showed several instances of abscondence, including a period of 391 days from 10 June 2025 to 5 July 2026, after which the petitioner surrendered on 6 July 2026.

The Court also noted that the petitioner had not disclosed his abscondence when approaching the Supreme Court.

Whether the petitioner was entitled to release on the basis of 802 days of remission allegedly accrued during his incarceration, so as to complete the sentence of life imprisonment quantified at 20 years?

Whether the absence of an express direction in the sentencing order excluding remission entitled the petitioner to claim remission before completing 20 years of actual imprisonment?

Whether the State’s order rejecting remission was arbitrary or legally unsustainable, warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution?

Whether the petitioner’s conduct, including repeated abscondence and suppression of material facts, justified rejection of the petition and parole application?

The Court exercised jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to examine the legality of the remission-rejection order.

It applied Section 433A of the CrPC, corresponding to Section 475 of the BNSS, under which a life convict must undergo at least 14 years of actual imprisonment before being considered for certain remission or release benefits; completion of 14 years does not create an automatic right to release.

The Court relied on Gopal Vinayak Godse v. State of Maharashtra, State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ratan Singh, Laxman Naskar v. State of West Bengal, Swamy Shraddananda v. State of Karnataka, Union of India v. V. Sriharan, and related authorities for the principle that life imprisonment ordinarily extends for the convict’s natural life unless remitted, commuted, or pardoned by the competent authority.

Under the principle reiterated in Sukhdev Yadav @ Pehalwan v. State of NCT of Delhi, remission quantified in time does not, by itself, result in release from a life sentence; it becomes operative to reduce the sentence only upon a final release order by the competent authority.

The Court also applied Paragraph 1420 of the Bombay Jail Manual, under which remission is calculated and accrued based on the period of incarceration, but mere accrual does not amount to an enforceable right to release.

The Court held that the petitioner’s sentence was life imprisonment quantified at 20 years and that this formulation indicated an intention that he undergo 20 years of actual imprisonment.

The sentencing court’s failure to expressly state that remission was excluded did not create a right to release before completion of that period.

The 802 days reflected in the RTI response represented remission accrued in the prison record under the Bombay Jail Manual; it did not constitute remission finally granted or an order reducing the petitioner’s life sentence.

Applying Gopal Vinayak Godse and the principles referred to in Sukhdev Yadav, the Court concluded that time-based remission cannot automatically reduce a life sentence to zero or compel release without a competent authority’s final release order.

The Court further found that the State had considered relevant factors, including the seriousness of the offence, the petitioner’s prison conduct, repeated abscondence, and the Jail Advisory Committee’s adverse recommendation.

No procedural irregularity or legal error in the impugned order was demonstrated.

The petitioner’s concealment of his ongoing abscondence from the Supreme Court and his surrender only after the High Court indicated that the matter would be heard upon his surrender were treated as conduct independently sufficient to disentitle him to relief.

His life sentence, quantified at 20 years, required consideration of actual incarceration, and the absence of an express exclusion of remission in the sentencing order did not alter that conclusion.

The State’s rejection of remission was found to be lawful and supported by relevant considerations, particularly the petitioner’s repeated abscondence and adverse conduct.

The petition was therefore dismissed, and the application for parole leave was disposed of accordingly.