A 99-year temple-property lease without court sanction cannot bind the temple under Section 36.

The Temple sued for possession of its property, arrears of rent and future mesne profits, alleging rent default and unauthorised subletting by its lessee, the first defendant.

The defendants relied on a registered lease deed executed in 1987 in favour of the first defendant’s father, said to grant a 99-year lease for a lump sum and permit subletting and construction.

The trial court dismissed the suit; the First Appellate Court reversed that decision and granted relief to the Temple.

Defendants 3 to 5 appealed to the High Court.

1. Whether the First Appellate Court erred in holding that the registered 99-year lease deed was invalid under Section 36 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882, despite finding that it had been executed by the then trustee.

2. Whether the Temple had issued a valid notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, terminating the tenancy.

Section 36 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882, as set out in the judgment, requires permission of the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction for a lease of trust property exceeding 21 years; a lease granted beyond that period without sanction does not bind the trust and may be challenged by its beneficiary.

Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, governs termination of leases by written notice.

The Court also applied the principle that, once the lessee’s tenancy is validly terminated, no separate notice to a sub-lessee is required, and the sub-lessee cannot claim a better right than the lessee.

The Court found that Ex. B1 purported to grant a 99-year lease of Temple property, with rights to sublet and deal with the superstructure, but had been executed without the court permission contemplated by Section 36; the defendants therefore could not rely on it to defeat the Temple’s claim to possession.

The Court further held that the Temple’s written notice dated 20 December 2000 terminated the first defendant’s tenancy with effect from 31 January 2001, met Section 106’s requirements, and preceded the suit. Because the second defendant claimed through the first defendant, a separate notice to the sub-lessee was unnecessary.

The Second Appeal was dismissed, with no order as to costs; the connected miscellaneous petition was closed.