A beneficiary must prove voluntary execution of a settlement deed when an illiterate settlor alleges fraud.

The plaintiff claimed that her father executed a settlement deed in her favour on 19 April 2005 and put her in possession of the suit property.

Her father later cancelled the deed and executed a sale deed in favour of the second defendant.

The plaintiff sued for relief including a declaration of title and challenged the cancellation.

The father admitted executing the settlement deed but asserted that he intended to settle the property on the second defendant, also known as “Madhu,” and that the plaintiff obtained the deed in her own favour by taking advantage of the similarity in names.

The trial court decreed the suit; the first appellate court reversed that decree and dismissed the suit.

The plaintiff brought this second appeal

Whether the first defendant was estopped under Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act from alleging that the settlement deed had been obtained by misrepresentation when the cancellation deed did not recite that ground

Whether the first appellate court erred in placing on the plaintiff the burden of proving that the settlement deed was not procured by misrepresentation

Whether the plaintiff established that the settlement deed was intended to benefit her and had been acted upon, such that its unilateral cancellation could not defeat her claimed title

The Court stated that a settlement deed cannot be unilaterally cancelled if it was duly executed and acted upon; it treated proof of execution and the deed having been acted upon as material to applying that principle

It also applied Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, holding that the rule was not absolute and that the first defendant was not estopped from alleging misrepresentation in the circumstances of this case

In assessing the burden of proof, the Court held that the plaintiff had to establish that the deed was intended to benefit her, having regard to the father’s illiteracy, the parties’ relationship and the alleged fiduciary circumstances

Although the father admitted executing the deed, the Court considered his denial that he intended it to benefit the plaintiff and his claim that he intended to benefit the second defendant, who was also called “Madhu.”

The Court found support for that account in the evidence that another settlement deed was executed in favour of the plaintiff’s sister on the same day and in the plaintiff’s failure to examine the attesting witnesses to prove that the deed was intended for her

It also relied on the plaintiff’s admission that possession had not been handed over and on the absence of evidence that the deed had been acted upon

In those circumstances, the Court held that the principle against unilateral cancellation did not assist the plaintiff and that Section 92 did not bar the father’s explanation of the alleged misrepresentation

The second appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs