A bidder cannot rely on the experience of its subsidiaries to satisfy mandatory eligibility criteria.

The Petitioner challenged a communication dated 20.02.2026 issued by the High Commission of India, London (Respondent No. 2), which disqualified the Petitioner from a tender for outsourcing Consular, Passport, and Visa (CPV) services.

The disqualification was based on the Petitioner's failure to meet the Mandatory Eligibility Criteria under Chapter V, Para 1(i) of the Request for Proposal (RFP).

The Petitioner had previously been disqualified on identical grounds by the Embassy of India, Abu Dhabi, a decision which was upheld by the Delhi High Court in W.P. (C) 1533/2026 on 06.02.2026.

Although the Petitioner appealed that decision to the Supreme Court (SLP (C) No. 6575/2026) and obtained a direction that no final decision be taken in the Abu Dhabi tender, there was no stay on the operation of the High Court's judgment.

Whether a bidding company can rely upon the experience of its subsidiary companies to satisfy the "Mandatory Eligibility Criteria" prescribed in an RFP when the tender document does not expressly permit such aggregation.

Whether the court should grant interim directions staying the finalization of the tender process despite a prior coordinate bench judgment on identical facts between the same parties.

The Court applied the principle of res judicata and the doctrine of binding precedents regarding identical tender conditions.

It followed the interpretation of Mandatory Eligibility Clauses which require the "Bidding Company" to possess "sound financial credentials of their own".

The Court relied heavily on the precedent set in Rohde and Schwarz GMBH and CO. Kg v. Airport Authority of India, which established that the experience of a subsidiary does not automatically translate to the experience of the holding company, and a bidder cannot claim the experience of a distinct legal entity as its own unless specified in the tender.

The Court noted that the RFP for the High Commission in London was identical to the one for the Embassy in Abu Dhabi.

It reasoned that Chapter V, Para 1(i) explicitly requires the "Bidding Company" to have the relevant experience and financial credentials "of their own" without third-party involvement.

The Court rejected the Petitioner’s argument that Chapter VI, Clause 1(d)—which prohibits subsidiaries from bidding separately—implied that their experience could be pooled; instead, the Court held this clause was intended to prevent anti-competitive behavior and cartelization.

Furthermore, since the Petitioner chose to bid as a single entity rather than a Joint Venture or Consortium (which was permitted under Chapter VI), it could not subsequently seek to incorporate the credentials of its subsidiaries.

The Court declined to grant interim relief or stay the tender process, observing that it was bound by its previous judgment dated 06.02.2026 involving the same parties and identical facts, which remained in operation as it had not been stayed by the Supreme Court.

All pending applications were disposed of accordingly.