A bidder denied timely notice of revised dues must receive a fair chance to pay.

The petitioner participated in a re-tender issued on 14 August 2026 for shops in Group MHR-3, Maihar, for the period ending 31 March 2027; bids were due and opened on 20 August 2026.

On 16 September 2026, the Assistant Commissioner Excise issued two letters bearing the same number. The first calculated the licence period from 25 July 2026 and demanded ₹10,41,03,556; the second calculated it from 21 August 2026 and demanded ₹11,67,08,023.

The State said the second letter corrected a clerical error in the first.

The petitioner asserted that the second letter was received only on 18 September, leaving insufficient time to pay. The State cancelled the offer on 21 September for non-payment and initiated a fresh tender, which had not been finalized by the time of the hearing.

Whether the second letter dated 16 September 2026 validly corrected the licence-period calculation in the first letter

Whether the petitioner was denied a fair opportunity to pay the revised licence fee and whether relief was warranted in the pending tender process

In contractual matters, writ-court interference is limited and is warranted where the impugned action discloses arbitrariness, irrationality, unreasonableness, bias, or mala fides; mere disagreement with a contractual decision is insufficient.

The Court relied on Tata Motors Limited v. The Brihan Mumbai Electric Supply and Transport Undertaking (BEST) and Others, (2023) 19 SCC 1, and Travancore Devaswom Board v. Ayyappa Spices, (2024) 7 SCC 543, for these principles.

The judgment applied no specific statute.

Since bids under the re-tender were due and opened on 20 August, the licence period properly ran from 21 August, not 25 July. The first letter therefore contained a ministerial error, and the second letter corrected that error; the Court found no basis to interfere with the revised fee calculation.

However, the email screenshot showed only one letter had been sent on 16 September, and the petitioner’s account that it received the revised letter on 18 September was not rebutted by contrary material. The petitioner was consequently not given the stated three days to pay, making the denial of an opportunity to comply arbitrary.

Because the fresh tender had not been finalized and no bidder had acquired rights under it, a limited opportunity to pay would meet the interests of justice.

If the petitioner complied within that period, the cancellation order and fresh tender process would lose their efficacy, and the petitioner would be entitled to the benefit of the offer.