A charge memorandum is invalid unless independently approved by the competent Disciplinary Authority under Rule 14.

The applicant, a retired Additional Commissioner of Income Tax, was due to retire on 30.06.2023 after approximately 36 years of service.

On 18.04.2023, he was served with a charge memorandum dated 11.04.2023 under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965.

The charges alleged that, while posted as Additional Commissioner, Income Tax, Rourkela, he caused delay in granting approval for reopening or reassessment of cases and failed to supervise the timely submission of reopening proposals by his subordinate, Shri John Bosco Minz, ACIT

The department stated that, after a preliminary examination and receipt of the applicant’s version, the matter was referred to the Central Vigilance Commission, which advised initiation of major-penalty proceedings.

The file was thereafter placed before the Finance Minister for acceptance of the CVC’s advice, initiation of proceedings, and approval of the draft charge memorandum.

The Finance Minister approved the proposal, following which the charge memorandum was issued.

The applicant submitted his written statement of defence, and an Inquiry Officer and Presenting Officer were appointed on 04.12.2024.

The applicant contended that the proceedings had been initiated on the dictates of the CVC/CVO rather than on an independent decision of the competent Disciplinary Authority, and that the charge memorandum had not been separately approved in accordance with Rule 14 and the principles laid down in Union of India v. B.V. Gopinath and Sunny Abraham v. Union of India.

He also relied on the Tribunal’s earlier decision quashing the proceedings against Shri John Bosco Minz arising from the same incident.

1. Whether the charge memorandum dated 11.04.2023 and the consequential appointment of the Inquiry Officer and Presenting Officer were invalid because the Disciplinary Authority had not independently decided to initiate proceedings and separately approved the charge memorandum as required by Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965

2. Whether the disciplinary proceedings were vitiated because the competent authority acted upon, or surrendered its discretion to, the advice of the CVC/CVO

3. Whether the applicant was entitled to release of his withheld retirement dues and interest after the disciplinary proceedings were quashed

Rule 14(2) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 requires the Disciplinary Authority to form an opinion that there are grounds for inquiring into the truth of the imputations and to take the decision to initiate disciplinary proceedings.

Rules 14(3) and 14(4) require the Disciplinary Authority to draw up, approve, and deliver the articles of charge and supporting material.

Relying on Union of India v. B.V. Gopinath, (2014) 1 SCC 351, and Sunny Abraham v. Union of India, the Tribunal held that the competent Disciplinary Authority must independently decide to proceed, approve the charge memorandum, and subsequently consider the employee’s defence before deciding whether to drop, modify, or continue the proceedings.

The principle against abdication or delegation of statutory discretion was drawn from Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1954 SC 322, and Nagaraj Shivarao Kargaji v. Syndicate Bank, AIR 1992 SC 1507.

The Tribunal also invoked the principle that an action required by statute to be performed in a particular manner must be performed in that manner alone, as reflected in Supertech Ltd. v. Emerald Court Owner Resident Welfare Association, (2024) 1 SCC (L&S) 819.

It additionally referred to Union of India v. J. Ahmed, AIR 1979 SC 1022, for the proposition that errors of judgment, innocent mistakes, or mere lack of leadership or supervisory performance do not, without more, constitute misconduct.

The Tribunal examined the departmental noting placed before the Finance Minister.

It found that the proposal sought a single approval both for accepting the CVC’s first-stage advice and initiating major-penalty proceedings, and for issuing the draft charge memorandum against the applicant and Shri Minz.

Applying B.V. Gopinath and Sunny Abraham, the Tribunal held that the statutory scheme required a distinct, independent decision by the Disciplinary Authority that sufficient material existed to initiate proceedings, followed by approval of the charge memorandum itself.

The wording of the proposal, and the fact that it substantially adopted the CVC’s recommendation to initiate major-penalty proceedings, demonstrated non-compliance with that procedure.

The Tribunal considered its earlier decision in Shri Minz’s case, arising from the same incident, to be directly applicable and declined to defer the matter merely because that decision was under challenge before the High Court; pendency of a writ petition, without an express stay, did not suspend the operative effect of the Tribunal’s decision.

Since the charge memorandum was legally defective, the subsequent appointment of the Inquiry Officer and Presenting Officer could not survive independently.

It quashed the charge memorandum dated 11.04.2023 and the order dated 04.12.2024 appointing the Inquiry Officer and Presenting Officer.

As the applicant had retired on 30.06.2023 and the disciplinary proceedings were no longer sustainable, the respondents were directed to release all retirement dues withheld on account of those proceedings within 60 days of receiving the order.

The claim for interest from the original due date was rejected; however, if payment was not made within the 60-day period, the applicant would receive interest at 8% per annum from expiry of that period until payment.

No costs were awarded, and any pending miscellaneous application was disposed of.