A charge-sheet is not ordinarily amenable to writ jurisdiction absent lack of authority or jurisdiction.

The petitioner, Secretary of Seerpanandal Primary Agricultural Cooperative Bank, was placed under suspension and subjected to an inquiry under Section 81 of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act.

Pursuant thereto, the first respondent issued a charge memorandum dated 5 August 2023 alleging misappropriation of substantial amounts belonging to the Society.

The allegations included alleged misappropriation of ₹62,52,310 from 83 savings bank accounts, ₹22,54,594 from a self-help group account, and ₹4,97,575 from sale proceeds.

The petitioner challenged the charge memorandum under Article 226 of the Constitution, contending that the list of witnesses had not been furnished and that no independent witnesses were proposed to be examined.

The respondents contended that a writ petition against a charge sheet was premature, unless the charge memorandum had been issued by an incompetent or unauthorised authority.

Whether a writ petition under Article 226 is maintainable to challenge a charge memorandum at the preliminary stage of disciplinary proceedings on the ground that no independent witnesses or witness list had been furnished?

Whether the alleged defect in the proposed evidence justified quashing the charge memorandum before completion of the disciplinary inquiry?

The Court applied the settled principle that a charge sheet or show-cause notice ordinarily cannot be challenged through a writ petition because it is not an adverse final order and does not, by itself, infringe any legal right; judicial interference is generally permissible only where the notice or charge sheet is issued by an authority lacking jurisdiction or competence, or in other exceptional circumstances.

This principle was drawn from Union of India v. Kunisetty Satyanarayana, (2006) 12 SCC 28, and State of A.P. v. Prabhash Chandra Mirdha, (2012) 11 SCC 565.

The Court also relied on State of Orissa v. Sangram Keshari Misra, (2010) 13 SCC 311, and Union of India v. Upendra Singh, (1994) 3 SCC 357, for the rule that the correctness or truth of charges is ordinarily to be determined by the disciplinary authority after inquiry, not by the writ court at the charge-sheet stage.

The decision in Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank, (2009) 2 SCC 570, concerning proof of charges in the context of a final disciplinary decision, was distinguished as inapplicable at the preliminary stage.

The Court found that the petitioner did not challenge the jurisdiction or competency of the authority that issued the charge memorandum; his sole objection concerned the absence of an independent witness list.

Applying the principles in Kunisetty Satyanarayana and Prabhash Chandra Mirdha, the Court held that the charge memorandum was only the initiation of disciplinary proceedings and did not constitute a final adverse order affecting the petitioner’s rights.

Whether the documentary material could be proved, whether witnesses were necessary, and whether the charges were ultimately established were matters for consideration during the disciplinary inquiry.

The Court therefore declined to apply Roop Singh Negi, since that decision concerned the validity of a final disciplinary order rather than the maintainability of a challenge to a charge sheet.

The serious nature of the alleged misappropriation further militated against terminating the proceedings at their inception.

Since there was no challenge based on lack of jurisdiction or competency of the issuing authority, and the objection related only to the proposed evidence, the charge memorandum was not liable to be quashed at that stage.

The writ petition was accordingly dismissed for want of merit, without costs, and the connected miscellaneous petitions were closed.