A consensual adult relationship, absent an initially false promise to marry, does not constitute rape.

The complainant, aged about 22 at the time of the alleged incident, alleged that she and the petitioner, a distant relative, had been in a relationship for about six years and had been sexually intimate.

She further alleged that on 22 September 2022 he had sexual intercourse with her on an assurance of marriage, later refused to marry her, and threatened her.

Following her complaint, police filed a charge-sheet against the petitioner and others for offences under Sections 376, 417, 354, 323 and 109 read with Section 34 of the IPC.

The petitioner sought quashing under Section 482 CrPC, contending that the relationship was consensual and that the parties had subsequently married, divorced, and settled their dispute; proceedings against the other accused had already been quashed.

1. Whether the complaint and witness statements disclosed rape or cheating on the basis of a false promise to marry, so as to justify continuation of the proceedings against the petitioner.

2. Whether, in light of the parties’ settlement and the earlier quashing of proceedings against the co-accused, continuation of the case against the petitioner would constitute an abuse of the process of law.

Section 375 IPC defines rape, including sexual intercourse without a woman’s consent; under Section 90 IPC, consent is vitiated where it is given under a misconception of fact and the accused knows, or has reason to believe, that the consent resulted from that misconception.

Relying on Shiva Prathap Singh Rana v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2024) 8 SCC 313, and the principles stated in Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 18 SCC 191, and Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 9 SCC 608, the Court noted that a promise-to-marry allegation vitiates consent where the promise was false, made in bad faith without an intention to fulfil it, and directly relevant to the woman’s decision to engage in the sexual act.

The Court also exercised its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to prevent abuse of the process of court.

The Court considered the complainant’s majority, the parties’ six-year relationship, and the complaint’s account of their continuing intimacy.

It found no specific allegation in the complaint or the complainant’s statement that the sexual acts occurred because of a misconception of fact or deception practised by the petitioner at the inception of the relationship; the other witnesses’ statements were substantially similar and omnibus.

Applying the cited principles, the Court concluded that the materials did not disclose the necessary basis for treating the relationship as non-consensual or the alleged promise as a false promise from the outset.

It also took account of the parties’ subsequent marriage and divorce, their settlement, and the quashing of proceedings against the co-accused, and held that continuing the case against the petitioner would be an abuse of process.