A consensual adult relationship and genuine intent to marry do not establish rape or cheating.

The appellant challenged his conviction under Sections 376(2)(n) and 417 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), and the corresponding sentences, arising from a relationship with the victim.

The prosecution alleged that he had sexual relations with her on the pretext of marriage.

The victim testified that their relationship had continued for over a year, that they had previously had sexual relations, and that the appellant later asked her to elope and marry him; the marriage proposal was opposed by his family.

The doctor assessed the victim’s age as over 18 and found no injuries or signs of recent intercourse.

The Sessions Court convicted the appellant, and he appealed.

Whether the evidence established that the appellant committed rape under Section 376(2)(n) IPC, or instead showed consensual sexual relations with an adult victim.

Whether the evidence established cheating under Section 417 IPC in connection with the appellant’s alleged promise of marriage.

The Court considered Section 376(2)(n) IPC, concerning repeated rape, and Section 417 IPC, concerning cheating.

It treated the victim’s adulthood and consent as material to whether the sexual relationship amounted to rape, and considered whether the evidence showed cheating in relation to the marriage proposal.

The Court accepted the medical assessment that the victim was over 18 and found no contrary evidence of minority.

It relied on her account of a longstanding relationship, prior sexual relations, exchanges of gifts, and continued contact to conclude that the sexual relationship was consensual; it also noted that the marriage proposal had failed.

As to Section 417, the Court found that the evidence indicated the appellant wished to marry the victim, while his family opposed the marriage, and therefore did not establish cheating by the appellant.

It also found no record evidence supporting the victim’s account of pregnancy and termination.

It quashed and set aside the judgment of conviction and order of sentence, allowed the appeal, and directed that the trial court record be returned; no further order was required because the appellant had already been released from custody.