A consequential attachment order cannot be challenged after the underlying order attains finality.

The petitioners challenged a Tahsildar’s order dated 16 January 2025 attaching property connected with their project.

The respondents submitted that the attachment was executed and possession of the subject land was taken on 21 March 2025; they also referred to subsequent steps toward auctioning flats.

The Court noted that the Deputy Commissioner had earlier acted on a communication from the Karnataka Real Estate Regulatory Authority (RERA), and that the petitioners’ appeal against RERA’s order was dismissed on 23 August 2025 and had attained finality.

The petitioners sought to have the Tahsildar’s attachment order quashed.

1. Whether the Court should interfere under Articles 226 and 227 with the Tahsildar’s order attaching the property.

2. Whether the petitioners could challenge the consequential attachment order when the underlying RERA order had attained finality.

The petition was brought under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, which provide the basis for the High Court’s writ and supervisory jurisdiction.

The Court applied the principle that, where the underlying order giving rise to consequential action has attained finality, a party cannot successfully challenge the consequential order without establishing a basis for interference; the Court cited no statute or precedent for this proposition.

The Court noted that the attachment followed action taken by the revenue authorities pursuant to the RERA-related order, had been executed, and was followed by steps toward auction.

It further considered that the petitioners had not produced material showing that the RERA order remained open to challenge, while the respondents’ submission that the appeal had been dismissed and the order had attained finality was before the Court.

In those circumstances, the Court declined to interfere with the consequential attachment order.

It left open the petitioners’ right to challenge the RERA order concerning the property, if they were otherwise entitled to do so in law.