### A contract terminable only for cause and subject to a cure period is not "determinable" under Section 14(d).

The Petitioner (Mahajan Imaging) and Respondent No. 1 (PSRI Hospital) entered into a Radiology Services Agreement on 02.05.2016 for a 15-year term

On 02.01.2026, the Respondent issued a Termination Notice alleging material breaches of statutory and contractual obligations (PC-PNDT Act and Atomic Energy Act violations), effective 02.02.2026

The Petitioner challenged the notice, asserting the Agreement required a mandatory 45-day cure period under Clause 10.2(a) which was never provided

The Petitioner filed this Section 9 petition seeking an interim injunction against the termination pending arbitration

The court primarily applied Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, which lists contracts not specifically enforceable, including those involving continuous duties and those determinable in nature

It relied heavily on the Supreme Court's classification in *K.S. Manjunath v. Moorasavirappa*, which distinguishes between contracts terminable "at will" (determinable) and those terminable only "for cause" with a cure notice (not determinable)

Precedents like *DLF Home Developers Ltd. v. Shipra Estate Ltd.* [para. 29] and *ArcelorMittal Nippon Steel (India) Ltd. v. Essar Bulk Terminal Ltd.* [para. 25] were utilized to define the scope of Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and the parameters for interim relief.

The Court reasoned that Clause 10.2(a) of the Agreement did not grant an "at-will" right to terminate; rather, it required a "material breach" and a 45-day "cure period"

Following *K.S. Manjunath*, the Court held that since the Respondent could not terminate the contract so long as the Petitioner remained willing to perform and was not in default (until the cure period lapsed), the contract was not "inherently determinable"

Regarding Section 14(b) SRA, the Court found that staying a termination does not require day-to-day judicial management of radiology services, as the parties had functioned independently for nine years

On the merits, the Court observed that the Respondent prima facie "put the cart before the horse" by terminating without adhering to the mandatory 45-day cure notice period

The Court found that the loss of the Petitioner’s commercial rights for the remaining five-year tenure and potential reputational harm constituted irreparable injury

It held that the Agreement is not determinable under Section 14(d) SRA because it requires a cure period for termination

The Court granted the petition, staying the Impugned Termination Notice dated 02.01.2026 and directing the parties to maintain *status quo* as it existed prior to the notice

The Respondents were directed to adhere to the contractual terms, and all rights were reserved for the Arbitral Tribunal