Unexplained delay and laches bar belated writ claims for interest on consequential benefits.

The petitioner had served respondent No. 2 as a Lecturer in Physics for approximately 20 years before his services were terminated on 31 July 2014.

He challenged the termination before the Educational Tribunal, Karnal.

By order dated 6 March 2019, the Tribunal set aside the termination and directed the respondents to release consequential benefits within three months, but did not award interest on those benefits.

The respondents challenged the Tribunal’s order before the High Court in CWP No. 14111 of 2019, but the challenge was dismissed.

LPA No. 1534 of 2023 and the subsequent Special Leave Petition were also dismissed on 24 January 2024 and 4 December 2024, respectively.

Although the consequential benefits, stated to amount to ₹73,38,436/-, were paid in instalments, the petitioner subsequently approached the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 seeking interest at 12% per annum from 27 April 2013 until the dates of respective payments.

Whether the petitioner could invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Court, after an unexplained delay of more than seven and a half years, to claim interest on consequential benefits that had not been awarded by the Educational Tribunal?

Whether the petitioner was entitled to interest at 12% per annum on the consequential benefits despite having accepted the Tribunal’s order dated 6 March 2019 without challenging its non-grant of interest within a reasonable period?

The Court exercised its discretionary jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, applying the doctrine of delay and laches.

Although limitation does not strictly govern proceedings under Articles 32 and 226, writ relief may be refused where the petitioner approaches the Court after an unreasonable and unexplained delay.

The Court relied on Chairman/Managing Director, U.P. Power Corporation Ltd. v. Ram Gopal, (2021) 13 SCC 225, which held that writ courts should ordinarily be reluctant to assist persons who sleep over their alleged rights, and that fence-sitters should not receive the same treatment as vigilant litigants.

The Court also relied on Mrinmoy Maity v. Chhanda Koley, 2024 AIR SC 2717, for the principle that undue and unexplained delay may itself justify dismissal of a writ petition in the exercise of Article 226 jurisdiction.

The principle that “delay defeats equity” was also reaffirmed.

The petitioner’s claim for interest arose from the Tribunal’s order dated 6 March 2019, which granted consequential benefits but expressly did not award interest.

The petitioner did not challenge the omission within a reasonable time and allowed the order to attain finality, while pursuing and defending the order only in relation to the termination and consequential benefits.

His subsequent writ petition, filed after more than seven and a half years, contained no plausible or compelling explanation for the delay.

Applying the principles of delay and laches, the Court held that the extraordinary and discretionary remedy under Article 226 could not be used to revive a claim that had not been timely pursued.

The petitioner’s acceptance of the Tribunal’s order and his failure to challenge the non-grant of interest disentitled him from seeking such relief at this belated stage.

Since the petitioner had failed to challenge the Tribunal’s non-grant of interest within a reasonable period and had provided no satisfactory explanation for the substantial delay, the Court declined to exercise its writ jurisdiction under Article 226.

The writ petition was accordingly dismissed.