A conviction may rest on a wholly reliable solitary eyewitness despite non-examination of another eyewitness.

On 14 March 2001, the petitioner was allegedly driving a truck to a brick kiln in a rash and negligent manner when it ran over Om Bir, aged approximately two years, who was playing nearby.

The child sustained injuries and died while being taken to the hospital. An FIR was registered under Sections 279 and 304-A of the Indian Penal Code.

The trial court convicted the petitioner primarily on the testimony of PW-5 Neelam, the deceased’s mother, and sentenced him to six months’ rigorous imprisonment under Section 304-A IPC, along with fines under Sections 279 and 304-A IPC.

The appellate court affirmed the conviction and sentence.

In revision, the petitioner challenged the reliability of the solitary eyewitness, alleged that the narrow road made high-speed driving impossible, and alternatively sought reduction of sentence to the period already undergone.

The court applied Sections 279 and 304-A IPC, which penalise rash or negligent driving on a public way and causing death by a rash or negligent act, respectively.

A conviction may be based on the testimony of a solitary eyewitness where the witness is wholly reliable, natural, consistent, and inspires confidence; non-examination of another eyewitness is not by itself fatal to the prosecution.

The court relied on Anoop Singh v. State of Rajasthan, Criminal Appeal No. 925 of 2016, decided on 13 August 2025, for the principle that corroboration is required where the testimony is neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable.

The court further applied the principle that rashness or negligence is not determined solely by the speed of a vehicle but by the surrounding circumstances and the degree of care reasonably required.

In sentencing, the passage of time and period already undergone are relevant considerations but do not automatically justify reducing a sentence to an inadequate period, particularly where the offence has resulted in the death of a young child.

The court distinguished Israfil @ Pappu @ Naimuddin Khan v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 INSC 654, on its facts.

The court found PW-5’s presence at the brick kiln natural because she was working there with her husband, and her presence was corroborated by the complainant’s statement in the FIR.

Her testimony remained intact during cross-examination and disclosed no material contradiction or infirmity.

The non-examination of the complainant therefore did not undermine the prosecution case.

The court also held that the narrowness of the road did not negate rashness or negligence.

The petitioner was driving a heavy truck near a brick kiln where labourers, family members, and young children were present; the truck running over the child demonstrated a failure to exercise the requisite care and caution.

As to sentence, the court held that although the occurrence was approximately 25 years old and the petitioner had undergone 18 days’ incarceration, those circumstances could not justify reducing the six-month sentence to the period already undergone, considering that the negligent act caused the death of a two-year-old child.

It held that the testimony of PW-5 was reliable and sufficient to sustain the conviction, that the petitioner’s conduct constituted rash and negligent driving under Sections 279 and 304-A IPC, and that the sentence of six months’ rigorous imprisonment under Section 304-A IPC was not disproportionate.

The revision petition was dismissed, and the conviction and sentence imposed by the trial court and affirmed by the appellate court were maintained.