A corruption acquittal must stand where the trial court reasonably finds demand and acceptance unproved.

The prosecution alleged that B. Nagaraju, a Bill Collector at Amble Gram Panchayat, demanded ₹2,000 from the complainant for an assessment extract and construction licence.

During a trap on 17 July 2010, the complainant paid ₹2,000 in tainted currency and a further ₹300, which the accused accepted.

The accused maintained that the money related to property-tax receipts he had issued in advance, and that the complainant owed ₹2,306 in tax.

The Special Court acquitted him of offences under Sections 7, 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; the State appealed under Section 378(1) and (3) CrPC.

Whether the prosecution established the alleged demand and acceptance of illegal gratification, rather than payment of the outstanding tax amount.

Whether the trial court’s acquittal disclosed a basis for appellate interference under Section 378 CrPC.

The appeal was brought under Section 378(1) and (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the alleged offences were under Sections 7, 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

Relying on *Constable 907 Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand*, *Babu Sahebgouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka*, *Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka* and *H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka*, the Court stated that an appellate court may reappraise evidence in an acquittal appeal, but should not reverse an acquittal where the trial court’s view is a reasonable possible view; interference is warranted where the acquittal is perverse or overlooks material evidence and the evidence permits no reasonable view consistent with innocence.

The judgment also affirmed the trial court’s application of the principle that proof of recovery or a positive phenolphthalein test, without proof that the money was demanded and accepted as illegal gratification, is insufficient; the Section 20 presumption cannot arise unless the necessary foundational facts are established.

The Court found no legal or factual error in the trial court’s assessment.

The recorded conversation and evidence concerning the trap supported the defence that the amount related to tax receipts totalling ₹2,306, rather than the alleged ₹2,000 bribe; the complainant’s payment of an additional ₹300 and the discussion about a remaining ₹6 also contributed to doubt about the prosecution’s account.

The shadow witness did not clearly hear the conversation, and the prosecution had not established the recorded voices through sample-voice comparison.

In those circumstances, the Court held that the trial court’s conclusion that demand and acceptance of illegal gratification were not proved was a possible view, not one warranting appellate reversal.

It dismissed the State’s appeal, leaving the respondent’s acquittal undisturbed.