01Facts
The opposite parties instituted Ejectment Suit No. 145 of 2024 before the Presidency Small Causes Court, Calcutta, seeking eviction under Section 6(1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 (“1997 Act”), alleging that the petitioner was in default of rent from October 2023.
¶ 3The petitioner entered appearance and filed a written statement but did not file applications under Sections 7(1) or 7(2) of the 1997 Act.
¶ 3–4The opposite parties thereafter applied under Section 7(3), contending that the petitioner had failed to comply with Section 7.
¶ 3–4In opposition, the petitioner disputed the landlord–tenant relationship, asserting that the erstwhile owner had agreed to sell the occupied premises to the tenants and had represented that no rent or occupational charges were payable pending completion of the sale.
¶ 5, 12–13The Trial Court allowed the Section 7(3) application and struck out the petitioner’s defence against delivery of possession solely for non-compliance with Section 7.
¶ 6The petitioner challenged that order under Article 227 of the Constitution.
¶ 1, 702Issues
i.Whether, where a defendant in an eviction suit under Section 6(1) of the 1997 Act disputes the existence of a landlord–tenant relationship without filing an application under Section 7(2), the Court must decide that dispute before striking out the defence under Section 7(3).
¶ 17ii.Whether the Trial Court erred in striking out the petitioner’s defence without first adjudicating the petitioner’s specific contention that no landlord–tenant relationship existed between the parties.
¶ 15, 29–3003Law Applied
The Court applied Sections 7(1), 7(2), and 7(3) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997, observing that these provisions refer to the obligations of a “tenant,” and that the consequence under Section 7(3) follows upon a tenant’s failure to comply with Sections 7(1) or 7(2).
¶ 27–28Relying on the Division Bench decision in Synthetic Plywood Industries (P) Ltd. v. Smt. Manjulika Bhaduri & Ors., (1998) 1 CHN 387, and the subsequent decisions in Baidyanath Kundu v. Sm. Jyotshna Rani Karmakar, AIR 1972 Cal 443; Nipendra Nath Chakraborty v. Brojendra Gopal Sen, AIR 1980 Cal 15; Calcutta Bonemills & Fertilisers (P) Ltd. v. Das Organochem (P) Ltd., 2013 SCC OnLine Cal 4147; and Manik Lal Sett v. Smt. Hira Basu @ Surali Basu & Ors., (2008) 2 CLJ 675, the Court held that a defendant disputing the very existence of the landlord–tenant relationship is not obliged to invoke Section 7(2), but the Court must determine that dispute before striking out the defence.
¶ 21–26The Court also followed the Division Bench ruling in Syed Khawaja Moin v. Md. Safi Alam, 2025 SCC OnLine Cal 7031, which held that this principle continues to apply under the 1997 Act because Section 7 uses the expression “tenant,” not “defendant.”
¶ 27Provisions in the judgment · 3 · Linked ones open on LawLens
West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 Section 6Section 7
west bengal premises tenancy act, 1956 Section 17
04Reasoning
The petitioner’s written objection, read as a whole, contained a specific and substantive denial of the landlord–tenant relationship, rather than merely a dispute regarding the quantum of rent or arrears.
¶ 12–13Under the governing authorities, such a plea could be raised even without an application under Section 7(2), since the statutory obligations under Section 7 attach to a “tenant” and not automatically to every defendant in an eviction suit.
¶ 24, 27–28If the petitioner’s contention were ultimately upheld, the statutory consequence of striking out the defence under Section 7(3) would not arise.
¶ 27The Trial Court, however, considered only the alleged non-compliance with Sections 7(1) and 7(2) and failed to adjudicate the foundational dispute regarding the parties’ legal relationship.
¶ 14–15, 29–30This amounted to a failure to exercise jurisdiction properly.
05Holding
The Court answered the legal issue in the affirmative: when a defendant disputes the existence of the landlord–tenant relationship under the 1997 Act, the Court must decide that issue before striking out the defence under Section 7(3), even if no application under Section 7(2) has been filed.
¶ 28The impugned order dated 9 February 2026 was set aside, and C.O. 1504 of 2026 was allowed.
¶ 31The Section 7(3) application was restored to the Trial Court, which was directed to decide the petitioner’s objection after hearing both parties and without unnecessary adjournments.
¶ 32The High Court expressly left the merits of the petitioner’s claim open for determination by the Trial Court.
¶ 32Original Court PDF
ARCHANA JAISWALvsKAUSHIK ROY AND ORS.
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