A direction for FIR registration is premature and non-prejudicial before the FIR is actually registered.

The petitioner, a Primary Teacher in the School Education Department, was also holding additional charge as In-charge Principal.

He claimed an unblemished service record and regular attendance through the “Hamare Shikshak App” pursuant to the Directorate of Public Instruction’s circular dated 20 June 2025.

Following a newspaper report concerning his attendance on 25 July 2026, the respondents passed orders dated 27 July 2026 placing him under suspension and directing the Block Education Officer to take steps for registration of an FIR.

The petitioner challenged both orders under Article 226, contending that the action was based solely on a newspaper report, that no preliminary or departmental enquiry or charge-sheet preceded the action, and that he was denied an opportunity of hearing.

The State defended the suspension as an order of the competent authority and submitted that the FIR direction caused no prejudice because no FIR had yet been registered.

Whether the writ petition challenging the direction for registration of an FIR was maintainable when no FIR had been registered and the direction had allegedly caused no immediate prejudice to the petitioner?

Whether the petitioner’s suspension and the direction to initiate criminal action were legally invalid for having been issued without a prior departmental or preliminary enquiry and without affording a hearing?

Whether departmental proceedings and criminal proceedings could proceed simultaneously in respect of the same alleged misconduct?

The Court applied Article 226 of the Constitution and the principle that writ jurisdiction should not ordinarily be invoked against a premature or non-prejudicial administrative communication.

Relying on Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh, it held that registration of an FIR is mandatory where information discloses a cognizable offence; where the information does not clearly disclose one but indicates the need for inquiry, a time-bound preliminary inquiry may be conducted to determine whether a cognizable offence is revealed, without examining the truthfulness of the allegations at that stage.

The Court further relied on Avinash Sadashiv Bhosale v. Union of India, Stanzen Toyotetsu India (P) Ltd. v. Girish V., State Bank of India v. Neelam Nag, Shashi Bhushan Prasad v. CISF, Depot Manager, A.P. SRTC v. Mohd. Yousuf Miya, and Kusheshwar Dubey v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. for the rule that departmental and criminal proceedings may ordinarily continue simultaneously; stay of departmental proceedings is justified only in exceptional cases involving identical facts, grave criminal charges, and complicated questions of law and fact where continuation may prejudice the employee’s defence.

The Court also reiterated that the two proceedings have distinct purposes and standards of proof: criminal liability is determined beyond reasonable doubt, whereas departmental misconduct may be established on a preponderance of probabilities.

The Court treated the direction to initiate an FIR as a preliminary administrative communication rather than a final determination of criminal liability.

Since no FIR had been registered, the petitioner had not suffered the prejudice alleged, and the police would follow the procedure recognised in Lalita Kumari before deciding whether a cognizable offence was disclosed.

The Court rejected the contention that criminal action could commence only after completion of departmental proceedings, observing that criminal and departmental proceedings serve different objectives and may legally operate in parallel.

It found no jurisdictional error, mala fide exercise of power, or arbitrariness in the impugned communication warranting interference under Article 226.

The challenge to the suspension and FIR-related communication was therefore considered premature and without sufficient legal basis.

It accordingly dismissed the writ petition.

However, the petitioner was granted liberty to submit a representation to the competent authority, which was directed to consider and decide it by a reasoned and speaking order, in accordance with law, within a reasonable period.