A disputed denial of hearing does not displace the statutory appeal where service turns on facts.

The petitioner challenged an ex parte order dated 31 January 2025 under Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, and the consequential DRC-07 dated 2 February 2025.

The petitioner alleged that it had not received notice of the personal hearings fixed for 13, 14 and 15 January 2025.

The respondent asserted that notice had been sent to the petitioner’s registered address and email, but produced only an extract from its dispatch register; the petitioner relied on earlier GST communications sent to a different email address.

The petitioner also challenged the penalty, interest computation, DRC-07 and DIN.

The Court noted that a statutory appeal under Section 107 was available.

Whether the Court should exercise its writ jurisdiction despite the petitioner’s alternative remedy, where denial of personal hearing was alleged but service was disputed on facts.

Whether the petitioner’s objections to the penalty, interest, DRC-07 and DIN should be determined in the writ petition or left for the statutory appellate process.

Article 226 of the Constitution permits the High Court to entertain a writ petition despite an alternative remedy in appropriate cases, including alleged breaches of natural justice; however, the availability of that exception does not require the Court to exercise its jurisdiction where the dispute turns on facts that can be examined by the statutory appellate authority.

Section 107 of the CGST Act provides the alternative appellate remedy.

Section 75(4) concerns the opportunity of personal hearing, while Sections 74(5)–(7) govern payment of tax, interest and penalty in the course of proceedings under Section 74; the Court noted the petitioner’s reliance on these provisions but did not decide their application on the merits.

Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 may be invoked to seek exclusion of time spent pursuing the writ petition, subject to consideration by the Appellate Authority.

Although denial of a personal hearing could engage the natural-justice exception to the alternative-remedy rule, the Court found that the central dispute—whether notice had been served at the petitioner’s registered address or email—required examination of the registration particulars, any subsequent amendments and the underlying record.

The respondent’s dispatch-register extract did not establish service, but the Court considered the factual dispute appropriate for determination by the Appellate Authority, where both parties could produce and contest evidence.

Similarly, resolving the penalty and interest objections would require examination of the audit materials, statutory forms and other relied-upon documents; the challenges concerning Rule 37, DRC-07 and DIN were also left for appellate consideration.

The petitioner was permitted to seek exclusion, under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, of the period during which the writ petition remained pending; the Appellate Authority was to consider any such application in accordance with law.

The Court expressed no opinion on the merits and left all objections, including service of the hearing notice, open for independent determination by the Appellate Authority.

The petition and pending application were disposed of accordingly.