A divorced wife’s desertion does not automatically bar maintenance if she remains unmarried and unable to maintain herself.

The petitioner challenged a Family Court, Erode order directing him to pay maintenance of ₹5,000 per month to each respondent and ₹10,000 towards litigation expenses.

He contended that his wife was employed, had deserted him, and could maintain herself; that his own income and agricultural resources were limited; and that the son had attained majority.

The judgment records that the marriage took place on 11 June 2003, the son was born on 20 July 2004, and the impugned order was made in M.C. No. 31 of 2022.

The petitioner sought to have that order set aside.

The judgment’s prayer section describes the challenged order as dated 24 February 2016.

Whether the Family Court’s maintenance order suffered from illegality, material irregularity, or perversity warranting interference in revision

Whether the wife’s alleged income, the petitioner’s claimed limited means, and the delay in bringing the maintenance claim justified setting aside or reducing the award

Whether the son’s attainment of majority affected his entitlement to maintenance under the applicable statutory conditions

The revision was brought under Sections 438 and 442 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.

The Court referred to the maintenance principles in Section 125 CrPC, including Explanation (b) to Section 125(1) and the disqualifications in Section 125(4): a divorced wife who has not remarried and is unable to maintain herself may claim maintenance, and desertion leading to divorce does not, by itself, bar that claim.

The Court relied on Rohtash Singh v. Ramendri (Smt.) and Others, (2000) 3 SCC 180.

It also stated that a major son’s entitlement is subject to statutory conditions, including physical or mental abnormality or injury that renders him unable to maintain himself, where applicable.

Revisional interference is not a rehearing on merits; it is warranted where the order suffers from illegality, material irregularity, perversity, or failure to consider relevant material.

The Court held that the wife’s alleged separation from the petitioner and the assertion that she earned ₹15,000 per month did not, without assessment of her actual financial circumstances, establish that she was disentitled to maintenance.

It considered the petitioner’s asserted ownership of approximately 1½ acres and cattle-rearing livelihood insufficient, on the grounds presented, to show that the award was excessive or unreasonable; actual income, assets, liabilities, and the claimants’ needs were relevant.

Delay in filing did not automatically extinguish a sustainable maintenance claim.

Although the son’s majority required consideration of the statutory conditions for continued entitlement, the Court concluded that this fact did not establish that the entire order should be set aside.

It found no sufficient revisional ground to disturb the Family Court’s order.

There was no order as to costs.