A final partition decree bars reopening or modifying the preliminary decree.

The first respondent/plaintiff instituted O.S. No. 5 of 2009 for partition. A preliminary decree was passed on 22 December 2011, followed by final-decree proceedings.

The petitioner, the eighth defendant, contended that defendants 1, 5, 7 and 8 had already entered into a registered partition deed on 3 January 2002 and that portions of the property had subsequently been sold to third parties, who had constructed houses and established “Sharon High School” on the property.

In I.A. No. 638 of 2017, the petitioner sought to implead the third-party purchasers.

In I.A. No. 3 of 2023, the petitioner sought modification of the preliminary decree or, alternatively, a fresh preliminary decree, contending that the plaintiff’s share had increased to one-eighth after the death of the first defendant and in view of the Hindu Succession law applicable to the parties.

By the time the revision petitions were heard, the final decree had been passed and the plaintiff had been put in possession of her allotted share.

The Court applied the principle that a preliminary decree determining the parties’ rights in a partition suit must be challenged in the manner known to law and cannot ordinarily be reopened through an interlocutory application after a final decree has been passed and possession has been delivered.

It also applied the principle that a party cannot prosecute the alleged grievances of third-party purchasers when those purchasers themselves have neither sought impleadment nor challenged the preliminary or final decree.

Section 29A of the Hindu Succession Act, as amended in Tamil Nadu, was considered in relation to the plaintiff’s claim that an unmarried daughter acquired coparcenary rights and was not bound by a partition effected behind her back.

The Court distinguished Jude Prathap v. Bavani Rani, 2024 SCC OnLine Mad 12263, where the impleading application of a pendente lite purchaser was pending and only a preliminary decree had been passed, relying on the principle that such circumstances differ materially from a case where a final decree has already been passed.

It followed Aburvakounder (Died) v. Balamurugan, C.R.P. No. 385 of 2024, order dated 3 January 2025, on the principle that a partition suit is fully and finally adjudicated after the final decree and cannot thereafter be reopened in the circumstances presented.

The Court held that the petitioner’s challenge was directed essentially to the rights of alleged third-party purchasers and to the correctness of the preliminary decree.

However, none of those purchasers had approached the Court or sought to challenge the decrees themselves.

Since the preliminary decree had been passed in 2011, the final decree had subsequently been allowed, and the plaintiff had already obtained possession, the petitioner could not use an application for impleadment or modification to reopen the adjudication.

If the petitioner was aggrieved by the declaration of the plaintiff’s rights, the proper remedy was to challenge the preliminary decree by appeal; the fact that the proposed appeal had not even been numbered and that no stay existed further weakened the petitioner’s case.

Jude Prathap was inapplicable because it concerned a pending impleading challenge before final adjudication, whereas the present matter involved a completed final decree and delivery of possession.

Consequently, no jurisdictional or legal error requiring revisional or supervisory interference was established.

It held that the petitioner could not implead third-party purchasers or seek modification of, or a fresh, preliminary decree after the final decree had been passed and the plaintiff had been put in possession, particularly when the affected purchasers had not themselves challenged the decrees.

C.R.P. Nos. 2117 of 2018 and 717 of 2026 were dismissed without costs, and the connected miscellaneous petitions, if any, were closed.