A finalized town-planning scheme bars collateral civil challenge and does not entitle occupants to alternative accommodation.

The respondents-plaintiffs, members of the same family and claiming to be long-standing tenants/occupiers of premises in Jarivala Chawl, Ahmedabad, challenged the implementation of Town Planning Scheme No. 8, Asarwa, which provided for an 80-foot-wide road affecting the suit premises.

They contended that the Town Planning Officer and Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation had failed to serve them individual notices under Rules 21(3) and 21(4) of the Bombay Town Planning Rules and that possession could not be taken without providing alternative accommodation.

The City Civil Court rejected the prayer to declare the varied scheme void but directed the Corporation to provide suitable alternative accommodation and protected the plaintiffs’ possession until such accommodation was provided.

The Corporation and the Town Planning Officer appealed under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Earlier, while disposing of the plaintiffs’ appeals against refusal of interim relief, the High Court had permitted them to remain only up to the stipulated date and directed them to hand over peaceful possession to the Corporation.

The varied Town Planning Scheme had been sanctioned and brought into force long before the suits were filed in 1997.

1. Whether the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain suits which directly or indirectly challenged the finalisation and implementation of the Town Planning Scheme.

2. Whether the plaintiffs were entitled to individual notice under Rules 21(3) and 21(4) of the Bombay Town Planning Rules, notwithstanding the applicability of the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976 and the Rules framed thereunder.

3. Whether the plaintiffs, merely as tenants or occupiers, had a legal right to alternative accommodation before eviction for implementation of the Town Planning Scheme.

4. Whether the City Civil Court could direct the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation to provide alternative accommodation in the absence of a statutory, contractual, policy-based, or otherwise enforceable right.

5. Whether the City Civil Court erred in granting relief to the plaintiffs.

The Court applied Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, recognising that Civil Courts ordinarily possess jurisdiction over civil rights unless expressly or impliedly barred, but held that the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976 constitutes a substantially self-contained statutory framework for finalised Town Planning Schemes.

Under Sections 65 and 67 of the 1976 Act, a sanctioned preliminary or final scheme operates as if enacted in the Act, and land required for the scheme vests absolutely in the appropriate authority free from encumbrances; Section 68 read with Rule 33 authorises summary eviction of persons continuing to occupy land which they are not entitled to occupy under the scheme.

The Gujarat Rules, particularly Rule 26, require prescribed public notice and opportunity to submit objections, but do not require the individual special notice contemplated by the unamended Bombay Rule 21(3) and (4).

Relying on Shilpa Park Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. v. Surat Urban Development Authority, Jaswantsingh Mathurasingh v. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, Kanjibhai Dahyabhai Malsattar v. State of Gujarat, Chandravadan Chunilal Shah v. State of Gujarat, and Babulal Badriprasad Varma v. Surat Municipal Corporation, the Court held that a finalised scheme can be questioned only on limited grounds such as jurisdictional transgression, total inconsistency with the governing statute, or non-compliance with essential statutory requirements.

Alternative accommodation cannot be ordered merely on equitable, humanitarian, or hardship considerations; it requires a legally enforceable right arising from statute, contract, binding policy, or enforceable promise.

The Court found that the scheme had been processed and sanctioned under the 1976 Act, which governed the proceedings after repeal and saving of actions under the Bombay Town Planning Act.

The plaintiffs’ reliance on Bombay Rules 21(3) and (4) was therefore misplaced; even if the amended Bombay Rule were considered, the requirement of individual special notice had been removed, while Rule 26 of the Gujarat Rules contemplated public notice and invitation of objections, not individual service.

The plaintiffs had in any event received statutory eviction notices and an opportunity to make representations.

Once the scheme had acquired statutory force, the land required for the proposed road vested in the Corporation and the plaintiffs could not retain possession contrary to the scheme.

The earlier High Court order directing the plaintiffs to vacate had also not been challenged and was binding; the City Civil Court acted improperly in proceeding on a legal basis inconsistent with that order.

Finally, the plaintiffs produced no statute, contract, policy, or promise conferring a right to alternative accommodation. Their long occupation and alleged hardship could not create such a right or authorise the Civil Court to modify or obstruct a finalised statutory scheme.

The finalised scheme had statutory force, the affected land stood vested in the appropriate authority, and the plaintiffs had no enforceable right to remain in possession or to receive alternative accommodation merely because of their long occupation or hardship.

All four appeals were allowed; the common judgment and decree dated 7 November 2002 passed by the City Civil Court in Civil Suit Nos. 145–148 of 1997 were quashed and set aside, with costs following the cause.

The request to stay operation of the judgment was rejected in view of the plaintiffs’ non-compliance with the earlier direction to vacate and hand over possession.