A finding of tenancy-in-common requires identified supporting material; unsupported conclusions cannot sustain restoration of possession.

The Petitioner challenged, under Section 25-B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (“DRC Act”), the order dated 9 September 2019 passed by the learned ACJ-cum-ARC, Central District, Delhi.

In execution proceedings arising from an eviction order obtained by the Petitioner against Vijay Kumar and another judgment-debtor, the legal heirs of deceased Respondent No. 1 filed an application under Section 25 of the DRC Act seeking protection from dispossession and restoration of possession.

The ARC held that Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 were tenants-in-common who had independently entered into tenancy arrangements with the Petitioner.

Since possession had already been obtained by the Petitioner, the ARC directed restoration of possession to the legal heirs of deceased Respondent No. 1.

The Petitioner contended that the finding regarding tenancy-in-common was unsupported by any tenancy agreement or other material.

Whether the ARC was justified in holding that Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 were tenants-in-common, despite identifying no tenancy agreement or other material supporting that conclusion?

Whether, on the basis of that finding, the legal heirs of deceased Respondent No. 1 were necessary parties to the eviction proceedings and were entitled to restoration of possession under Section 25 of the DRC Act?

Whether the ARC’s order disclosed a jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material irregularity, or an error apparent on the face of the record warranting interference under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act?

Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act confers a supervisory and revisional, not appellate, jurisdiction on the High Court; interference is warranted where the decision-making process suffers from a jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material irregularity, perversity, or an error apparent on the face of the record, but not merely because another factual view is possible.

The Court relied on Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh, and Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua, as well as Pankaj Pahwa v. Prem Wati and Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny Grover, for the limited scope of revision under Section 25-B(8).

The distinction between joint tenancy and tenancy-in-common is material: joint tenancy involves unity of title and other incidents including survivorship, whereas tenancy-in-common involves unity of possession but separately held interests or shares.

However, the character of a tenancy must be determined from the material governing its creation and holding; the general legal distinction between the two forms of tenancy cannot itself establish the factual nature of the tenancy.

The ARC correctly recognised the conceptual distinction between joint tenancy and tenancy-in-common but failed to identify any tenancy agreement or other document showing that Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 had independently entered into the tenancy or held separate interests.

The conclusion that they were tenants-in-common was therefore derived from a general legal distinction rather than from evidence or material specific to the tenancy in question.

Since the finding of tenancy-in-common formed the entire basis for holding that the legal heirs of deceased Respondent No. 1 were necessary parties and were not bound by the eviction order, the unsupported foundational finding vitiated the consequential directions for restoration of possession.

The defect was apparent from the ARC’s order itself and required no fresh appreciation of evidence, thereby falling within the permissible scope of revisional interference under Section 25-B(8).

Consequently, the findings that the legal heirs of deceased Respondent No. 1 were not bound by the eviction order and were entitled to restoration of possession could not be sustained.

The Revision Petition was allowed, the ARC’s order dated 9 September 2019 was set aside, and the petition along with the pending application was disposed of accordingly.