A fresh writ seeking identical relief is not maintainable without express liberty after earlier disposal.

The State initiated selection for a Part-Time Multi-Task Worker at Government Primary School, Chandraini, under the Part-Time Multi-Task Worker Policy, 2022. Both Prikshit and Veena applied, and Veena was initially appointed.

Prikshit challenged her appointment before the appellate authority. By order dated 30 January 2023, the appeal was allowed, Veena’s selection was set aside, and the authority directed that Prikshit be selected.

Pursuant thereto, the State offered the post to Prikshit and terminated Veena’s engagement on 21 June 2023; Prikshit joined on 26 June 2023.

Veena challenged the appellate order in CWP No. 4151 of 2023. On 27 June 2023, the Court granted an interim stay, observing prima facie violation of natural justice and delay in the appeal. In compliance, Prikshit was discharged from service.

On 21 September 2023, Veena’s writ petition was disposed of as infructuous after the State informed the Court that Prikshit had been terminated and Veena had rejoined the post; no adjudication on the merits of the appellate order was made.

Prikshit’s application seeking recall of that order was dismissed on 6 August 2024, but he was granted liberty to challenge his termination in appropriate proceedings.

He thereafter filed CWP No. 11745 of 2024, seeking quashing of his discharge and re-engagement against the post.

Veena subsequently filed CWP No. 6572 of 2026, again seeking quashing of the appellate order dated 30 January 2023 and the consequential orders dated 21 June 2023.

1. Whether Veena’s subsequent writ petition challenging the appellate order was maintainable when her earlier writ petition seeking substantially the same relief had been disposed of without adjudication on merits and without express liberty to institute fresh proceedings?

2. Whether the appellate order setting aside Veena’s selection and directing Prikshit’s appointment had attained finality after the earlier writ petition was disposed of without the appellate order being quashed?

3. Whether Veena could continue on the post, and whether Prikshit was entitled to re-engagement with consequential benefits?

The Court applied the principles governing maintainability of successive writ proceedings and finality of judicial and administrative orders.

A subsequent writ petition seeking substantially the same relief is not maintainable where an earlier writ petition claiming that relief has been disposed of and no express liberty to file a fresh proceeding has been granted.

The Court also applied the principle that an interim order merges into, or ceases to operate upon, disposal of the substantive proceedings; where the writ petition is disposed of without quashing the challenged administrative order, the interim arrangement cannot by itself nullify that order.

The Court further relied on the settled requirement that affected parties must receive a fair hearing, as reflected in the Division Bench’s prima facie finding of violation of natural justice in the original appellate proceedings.

The Court found that Veena’s earlier writ petition had not resulted in any merits determination invalidating the appellate order dated 30 January 2023. It had merely been disposed of as infructuous because Prikshit had been discharged pursuant to the interim order and Veena had rejoined the post.

The subsequent dismissal of Prikshit’s recall application expressly preserved his right to challenge his termination, but did not grant Veena liberty to file a fresh petition challenging the same appellate order.

Consequently, Veena’s 2026 petition, which sought substantially the same relief as her earlier petition, was held not maintainable.

Since the appellate order had neither been quashed nor set aside and no finding had been returned that it was legally invalid, the Court treated it as having attained finality.

The discharge of Prikshit was held to have been only a consequence of the interim order, which ceased to govern after disposal of the earlier writ petition. Veena therefore had no lawful basis to continue against the post.

The Court held that the appellate order dated 30 January 2023 had attained finality and that Veena’s continuation as Part-Time Multi-Task Worker was unsustainable.

The State was directed to terminate Veena from the post and re-engage Prikshit against it.

Prikshit’s engagement was directed to be reckoned from the date of his initial engagement, together with all consequential benefits.

Both petitions and pending miscellaneous applications were disposed of accordingly.