A genuine settlement warrants quashing private cyber-offence proceedings where conviction is remote.

In brief

The question

1. Whether the High Court should exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS, 2023, to quash the FIR on the basis of a settlement between the petitioner and the informant?

The court held

The High Court held that the case was a fit one for exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS, 2023.

It also directed

It quashed and set aside Cyber P.S. Case No. 37 of 2025, registered under Sections 319(2) and 318(4) of the BNS, 2023, and Sections 66C and 66D of the Information Technology Act, 2000, qua the petitioner.

The criminal miscellaneous petition was allowed, and the connected Interlocutory Application No. 11854 of 2026 was disposed of.

01Facts

The petitioner sought quashing of the FIR in Cyber P.S. Case No. 37 of 2025, registered under Sections 319(2) and 318(4) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, and Sections 66C and 66D of the Information Technology Act, 2000, by invoking the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.

¶ 2

The investigation was still pending and no charge-sheet had been filed.

¶ 3

During the proceedings, the petitioner and the informant, Opposite Party No. 2, filed separate affidavits stating that they had amicably settled their dispute with the assistance of well-wishers and friends, without coercion or undue influence.

¶ 4

The informant expressed that he did not wish to pursue the criminal case further.

¶ 4

The State raised no objection to quashing the proceedings in view of the settlement.

¶ 5

02Issues

i.1. Whether the High Court should exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS, 2023, to quash the FIR on the basis of a settlement between the petitioner and the informant?

¶ 2, 4–6

ii.2. Whether the nature of the alleged offences and the parties’ compromise rendered the possibility of conviction remote and continuation of the criminal proceedings oppressive or an abuse of process?

¶ 6–8

03Law Applied

The Court exercised its inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS, 2023, corresponding to the High Court’s power to prevent abuse of process and secure the ends of justice.

¶ 2

It relied on Parbatbhai Aahir @ Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Karmur v. State of Gujarat & Anr., (2017) 9 SCC 641, which, following Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, held that the power to quash criminal proceedings on the basis of compromise is distinct from the statutory power of compounding; the High Court must consider the nature and gravity of the offence, the impact on society, whether the dispute is predominantly private or civil in nature, the likelihood of conviction, and whether continuation of the proceedings would constitute abuse of process or cause injustice.

¶ 6

Heinous offences, offences involving serious mental depravity, and offences under special statutes having a public character ordinarily should not be quashed merely because the parties have settled; however, proceedings arising from private disputes may be quashed where the settlement is genuine and the possibility of conviction is remote.

¶ 6

The FIR alleged offences under Sections 319(2) and 318(4) of the BNS, 2023, and Sections 66C and 66D of the Information Technology Act, 2000.

¶ 2

Provisions in the judgment · 5 · Linked ones open on LawLens

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 Section 528

Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 Section 319 Section 318

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 Section 482 Section 320

04Reasoning

The Court found that the alleged offences were neither heinous nor indicative of serious mental depravity.

¶ 7

It treated the criminal case as arising from a misunderstanding between the parties and noted that the dispute had been amicably and voluntarily settled, as confirmed by the parties’ affidavits.

¶ 4, 7

Since the informant no longer wished to pursue the case and the State had no objection, the Court concluded that the likelihood of conviction was remote.

¶ 4–8

Applying the principles in Parbatbhai Aahir, the Court held that continuation of the proceedings after the settlement would cause hardship to the petitioner and would not advance the ends of justice.

¶ 6–8