A Gram Panchayat cannot displace the prescribed merit list through a majority resolution.

The Gram Panchayat appointed Ajay Singh as Panchayat Secretary by resolution dated 17 March 2008.

Respondent No. 4 challenged the appointment, asserting that the Government policy dated 13 August 2007 required selection by merit: he had secured 59.60% and ranked first, while Singh had secured 43.20% and ranked ninth.

The Sub-Divisional Officer set aside Singh’s appointment; subsequent proceedings before the Collector and revisional authorities culminated in the Additional Commissioner’s order of 23 February 2013, as corrected on 28 February 2013, upholding the Sub-Divisional Officer’s order.

The State Government dismissed Singh’s revision on 28 December 2016.

Singh challenged that decision under Article 226, relying, among other things, on his additional qualifications, delay in the proceedings, and his continued service.

1. Whether the Gram Panchayat could appoint Singh by majority resolution despite the merit ranking prescribed by the Government policy dated 13 August 2007

2. Whether delay in the proceedings and Singh’s continued service warranted interference with the State Government’s decision under Article 226

The Court applied the Government policy dated 13 August 2007, which required appointment on the basis of merit and adherence to the prescribed selection criteria.

It also applied the principle that additional qualifications do not, by themselves, permit an appointing authority to depart from the prescribed method of determining merit.

In exercising writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, the Court considered whether the authorities’ decision disclosed perversity, patent illegality, or jurisdictional error.

No judicial precedents were cited in the judgment.

The Court found that the applicable policy required selection by merit and that the Gram Panchayat had no demonstrated legal basis to disregard the merit list in favour of Singh, who ranked ninth, merely by passing a majority resolution.

Singh’s higher qualifications did not alter the merit ranking because the policy identified the qualifying examination as the basis for selection.

The Court also held that neither the passage of time nor Singh’s continued service could validate an appointment made contrary to the prescribed criteria.

It found no perversity, patent illegality, jurisdictional error, or miscarriage of justice in the authorities’ decisions sufficient to warrant writ interference.

It dismissed the writ petition, leaving the impugned decision undisturbed.