A Magistrate cannot convert administrative information into a criminal complaint and direct FIR registration.

The petitioners, the Tehsildar and Executive Officer of the Municipal Committee, Thanamandi, challenged FIR No. 117/2018 under Sections 447-A and 427 RPC.

The FIR followed a Magistrate’s direction based on information submitted by a Court Chowkidar, who alleged that officials had entered land in the possession of the Munsiff Court, demarcated part of it for shops, and damaged barbed wire.

The petitioners said they had acted on directions from superior revenue officials to transfer land to a person whose land had been acquired for a PMGSY road project.

The investigating agency reported that the land was recorded in the name of the Revenue Department but had long been occupied by the Court.

The petitioners sought quashing, arguing, among other things, that the complainant had not followed Sections 154(1) and 154(3) Cr.P.C. before approaching the Magistrate and had not supported the application with an affidavit.

Whether the Magistrate could direct registration of an FIR on the basis of the Chowkidar’s communication, which the Court found was information about an alleged attempt to occupy Court land rather than a criminal complaint seeking FIR registration.

Whether the FIR and proceedings arising from that direction were sustainable in law, having regard to the procedure discussed in Priyanka Srivastava v. State of U.P.

Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. concerns a Magistrate’s power to direct police investigation; an administrative communication that does not seek FIR registration cannot properly be treated as an application invoking that power.

The Court relied on Priyanka Srivastava and Anr. v. State of U.P. and Others, 2015 (6) SCC 287, as prescribing procedural safeguards for applications seeking directions under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., including compliance with the statutory approach to the police under Sections 154(1) and 154(3) Cr.P.C.

Sections 447-A and 427 RPC were the provisions invoked in the FIR, but the Court did not determine the petitioners’ criminal liability under them.

The Chowkidar’s communication merely brought the alleged attempt to occupy land in the Court’s possession to the Presiding Officer’s attention; it contained no prayer for registration of an FIR and was not a Section 156(3) application in the strict sense.

The Magistrate therefore should not have treated it as a criminal complaint and directed FIR registration.

The Court held that this course both failed to follow the procedure identified in Priyanka Srivastava and gave a criminal character to what was, in the circumstances, an administrative matter.

Separately, it observed that the petitioners’ attempt to occupy land long used by the Court, without first bringing the matter to the Presiding Officer or District Judge, warranted attention on the administrative side.

It further provided that the Registrar General may take up the matter with the Deputy Commissioner, Rajouri, to resolve the land issue administratively.