A misdescribed survey number does not defeat execution where property identity is established by its boundaries.

The respondent/decree-holder obtained an ex parte decree dated 13 December 2002 in O.S. No.546 of 1994 and thereafter initiated E.P. No.50 of 2003.

The suit concerned property described as situated in S.No.509/B/10B.

In execution, the decree-holder filed E.A. No.11 of 2017 seeking amendment of the execution petition, and consequential amendment of the plaint and decree, to correct the survey-number description.

The petitioner/judgment-debtor objected that the relevant sale deeds referred to S.No.509/10B, that the decree-holder had not obtained a rectification deed or decree, and that the original owner, Theresa, had retained only 1.25 cents after selling 2.75 cents to the petitioner and therefore could not have conveyed 3.75 cents to the decree-holder’s predecessors.

Earlier proceedings concerning the extent, title, obstruction to delivery, and validity of the decree had been carried through the High Court and the Supreme Court, with the petitioner’s challenges being dismissed.

On remand from the Supreme Court, the Executing Court reconsidered E.A. No.11 of 2017 and allowed the amendment.

The petitioner challenged that order under Section 115 CPC.

Whether the Executing Court could entertain and allow an application seeking correction of the survey number in the execution petition, with consequential amendments to the plaint and decree, notwithstanding that the decree-holder had not obtained a rectification deed or separate rectification decree.

Whether a decree-holder could execute the decree where the decree-holder’s sale deed contained an allegedly incorrect survey number, but the identity of the property was established through its boundaries and other particulars.

Whether the judgment-debtor could re-agitate the contention that Theresa owned only four cents and could not validly convey 3.75 cents, after that issue had been conclusively determined in earlier proceedings culminating in dismissal of the petitioner’s Special Leave Petitions.

The Court exercised its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and applied the principle that a decree should not be defeated by a mere technical or clerical misdescription where the identity of the subject property is otherwise established.

It further applied the doctrine of finality of litigation, holding that issues conclusively decided in prior proceedings cannot be re-agitated in execution.

The Court recognised that the proper procedural course would ordinarily be to amend the plaint, followed by consequential amendment of the decree and execution petition; however, procedural irregularity would not warrant interference where the same court was dealing with the execution proceedings and no prejudice was caused.

The Court also considered the petitioner’s reliance on Venkatesha v. K.M. Venkata Muniyappa, 2026 INSC 705, concerning the limits of granting relief beyond pleadings, but found it inapplicable on the facts.

The Court held that the petitioner’s argument regarding Theresa’s alleged ownership of only four cents had already been rejected in the earlier litigation, where it was found that the relevant survey field comprised 54 cents and that Theresa had sold 2.5 cents, not 2.75 cents, to the petitioner.

Those findings had attained finality after dismissal of the petitioner’s appeals, revisions, and Special Leave Petitions; consequently, the issue could not be reopened in the present revision.

Although the sale deeds contained variations between “S.No.509/10B” and “S.No.509/B/10B,” the subsequent transaction specifically mentioned the correct survey number, and the boundaries and description of the property tallied with the suit property.

The absence of a rectification deed did not defeat execution because the property’s identity was not genuinely in dispute.

While the Court observed that amendment should ordinarily have been sought before the Trial Court in the proper sequence, the Executing Court was also the Trial Court in the present matter, and the petitioner suffered no prejudice because consequential amendments to the plaint and decree had been sought and considered.

The Court therefore treated the survey-number discrepancy as a curable misdescription rather than a defect affecting title or the executability of the decree.

It held that the petitioner could not reopen the conclusively determined issue concerning the extent available with Theresa, and that the incorrect survey-number reference in the decree-holder’s sale deed did not prevent execution where the property was identifiable from its boundaries and surrounding particulars.

The Executing Court was directed to dispose of E.P. No.50 of 2003 on merits and in accordance with law within three months from receipt of the High Court’s order.

No costs were awarded.