A partner’s joint dominion over firm property does not attract aggravated criminal breach of trust.

The petitioner, the complainant, and co-accused Nishikant were partners in M/s MACH RECON, which maintained a bank account with Axis Bank.

The complainant alleged that the petitioner, who operated the account, withdrew and transferred firm funds without proper accounting or mutual consent, causing an alleged loss of ₹1,85,50,500.

An FIR was registered at Police Station Neelganga, Ujjain, and the petitioner was arrested on 15 January 2026. After investigation, a charge-sheet was filed, and the Judicial Magistrate First Class framed charges under Sections 318(4) read with Section 3(5) and 316(5) read with Section 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (“BNS”) by order dated 22 July 2026.

The respondents alleged that he had exclusive control over the account, diverted funds to another company operated by him and his wife, and carried out nearly 400 suspicious transactions.

Whether, at the stage of framing charges, the petitioner could be charged under the aggravated criminal-breach-of-trust provision corresponding to Section 409 of the IPC, merely because he exercised dominion over partnership funds as a partner.

Whether the trial court committed a patent legal or jurisdictional error warranting revisional interference in framing the aggravated charge.

The Court applied Sections 438 and 442 of the BNSS concerning criminal revision and the relevant provisions of the BNS, particularly Section 316(5), which corresponds to Section 409 of the IPC and applies where criminal breach of trust is committed by a person entrusted with property in the capacity of a public servant, banker, merchant, factor, broker, attorney, or agent.

Relying on G. Saminathan v. The State, 2026 INSC 772, the Court reiterated that criminal breach of trust requires entrustment or dominion over property, dishonest misappropriation, conversion, use, or disposal, and violation of a legal direction or contractual obligation governing the trust.

Revisional interference is justified where the impugned order suffers from patent illegality, perversity, or jurisdictional error; however, a mini-trial is impermissible at the stage of framing charges.

The Court accepted that the parties’ relationship was that of partners governed by a partnership deed.

A partner’s dominion over partnership property arises from the partnership relationship and joint ownership of the firm’s business, not necessarily from a specific entrustment in the capacity of a banker, merchant, factor, broker, attorney, agent, or other specially protected category contemplated by the aggravated provision.

The partnership deed described the parties as co-businessmen acting with mutual commercial authority, and the record did not disclose any specific entrustment of the complainant’s property to the petitioner in one of the statutory capacities.

Accordingly, although the allegations might support continuation of the ordinary charge under Section 318(4) of the BNS, the material did not prima facie satisfy the additional statutory requirement for the aggravated criminal-breach-of-trust charge.

The framing of that charge therefore involved a material legal infirmity and jurisdictional error.

The Court set aside the Magistrate’s order to the extent that it framed the aggravated charge and discharged the petitioner from that charge, while permitting the trial to proceed under Section 318(4) of the BNS in accordance with law.

The judgment contains an apparent clerical inconsistency: the challenged aggravated provision is identified in the earlier discussion as Section 316(5) BNS, corresponding to Section 409 IPC, whereas paragraphs 27 and 29 refer to Section 318(5) BNS. The operative relief appears intended to relate to the aggravated criminal-breach-of-trust provision under Section 316(5) BNS.