A party has no automatic right to expert comparison of disputed signatures.

The petitioner, plaintiff in O.S. No. 192/2009, challenged the trial court’s order rejecting her application under Order XXVI Rule 9 CPC for expert comparison of signatures on an agreement of sale dated 20 June 1990 with signatures said to be admitted signatures of the original defendant No. 1.

The written statement specifically denied the transaction and described the agreement as false and incorrect; the petitioner had not produced the original registered mortgage deed said to contain the admitted signatures.

Both parties had concluded their evidence, including evidence from the agreement’s attesting witness and the scribe’s son, and the suit was set down for arguments.

The trial court rejected the application, finding the evidence on record sufficient to decide the dispute.

Whether the trial court erred in rejecting the plaintiff’s application for expert comparison of the disputed signatures under Order XXVI Rule 9 CPC.

Whether the trial court’s order disclosed illegality or perversity warranting interference under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.

Order XXVI Rule 9 CPC provides for a commission for local investigation; the petitioner invoked it to seek expert comparison of signatures.

A dispute or denial concerning a document’s execution does not, by itself, entitle a party to an expert examination as a matter of right; a reference should not be made mechanically.

The party asserting fraud, forgery, or fabrication bears the burden of establishing that allegation.

The High Court’s supervisory jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 does not warrant interference absent illegality or perversity in the impugned order.

The Court found that the defendants denied the agreement’s execution and the underlying transaction, rather than admitting execution while disputing only the signatures.

The petitioner had not produced the original mortgage deed containing the alleged admitted signatures, and the parties had already completed their evidence.

Given the evidence already led and the trial court’s assessment that the record was sufficient, the Court held that expert comparison was not justified as a matter of right and that the application was belated, particularly as the suit was ready for arguments.

It found no illegality or perversity warranting supervisory interference.

It directed the trial court to proceed expeditiously and conclude the suit, permitting both parties to address arguments afresh if requested.