A party's gross negligence and inaction in pursuing legal remedies preclude condonation of inordinate delay.

The petitioner invoked the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution, challenging the order dated 09-09-2025 passed by the 12th Additional District Judge, Vadodara, in Civil Misc. Application No. 120/2025, whereby the Appellate Court rejected his application for condonation of delay in filing a regular appeal.

The underlying proceeding was a summary suit (Special Civil Suit No. 86/2022) in which the 19th Addl. Senior Civil Judge, Vadodara, passed a money decree of Rs. 37,50,000/- with 6% p.a. interest against the petitioner on 21-04-2023, the petitioner having remained absent and led no evidence during the suit.

Although the petitioner was aware of the decree at the time of its passing, he filed the appeal only in June 2025—approximately 720 days later.

Even after the certified copy was ready on 07-03-2025, the appeal and delay application were filed only on 13-06-2025, a further delay of ~98 days.

In the delay application, the petitioner pleaded (i) a heart attack suffered on 21-11-2023 requiring admission to Bankers Heart Institute and continued medication, and (ii) financial constraints in arranging court fees of Rs. 45,800/-.

Notably, the petitioner never sought time under Section 149 CPC to deposit the deficient court fees.

Before the High Court, the petitioner also declined to deposit costs of Rs. 25,000/- sought as a condition for issuing notice to the respondent.

1. Whether the Appellate Court committed any error of law in rejecting the petitioner's application for condonation of an inordinate delay of approximately 720 days in filing the appeal against the money decree dated 21-04-2023.

2. Whether the petitioner made out "sufficient cause" within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, on the grounds of ill-health (heart attack on 21-11-2023) and financial inability to pay court fees.

3. Whether interference under Article 227 of the Constitution was warranted against the impugned order dated 09-09-2025.

Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, governing condonation of delay upon demonstration of "sufficient cause," read with Section 3 (to be construed strictly, barring time-barred remedies) and Section 149 CPC (empowering courts to grant time for payment of court fees).

The maxim vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt—law aids the vigilant, not those who sleep over their rights, as per Rajneesh Kumar v. Ved Prakash, 2024 (14) SCALE 406.

The principle that discretion to condone delay must be exercised judiciously, not where there is gross negligence or want of due diligence, and that a liberal construction of "sufficient cause" is permissible only where no negligence, inaction, or want of bona fides is imputable, as per K.B. Lal v. Gyanendra Pratap, 2024 (4) Scale 759 (applying Esha Bhattacharjee, (2013) 12 SCC 649).

Condonation cannot defeat the substantive bar under Section 3 and may be refused notwithstanding sufficient cause where delay is inordinate, per propositions in Pathapati Subba Reddy v. Special Deputy Collector (LA), 2024 INSC 286.

A negligent or inactive litigant disentitled to condonation cannot be granted relief even by imposing conditions, as that would violate statutory provisions, per Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81.

The length of delay is a relevant factor and the Court must first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation before considering merits, per Shivamma (Dead) by LRs v. Karnataka Housing Board, 2025 INSC 1104.

The heart attack plea failed on chronology: the petitioner admittedly knew of the decree on 21-04-2023, yet the cardiac event occurred only on 21-11-2023—over seven months later—leaving the crucial limitation period entirely unexplained.

The financial-crunch plea was equally untenable; even after obtaining the certified copy on 07-03-2025, the petitioner waited approximately 98 days to file the appeal, and never availed the remedy under Section 149 CPC to seek time for depositing court fees, which a genuinely impecunious but diligent litigant would have done.

The Court treated the petitioner's refusal to deposit even Rs. 25,000/- in costs as a conditional requirement for issuing notice as reinforcing the absence of bona fides, observing that burdening the respondent—holder of an executed money decree of Rs. 37.5 lakhs—without such a condition would be unjust.

Weighing the conduct, behaviour, and inaction of the petitioner against the Esha Bhattacharjee parameters and the Pathapati Subba Reddy propositions, the Court concluded that the Appellate Court's approach was neither hyper-technical nor erroneous; it independently concurred with the rejection of the delay application.

The petition was accordingly dismissed in limine, with no order as to costs.