A party who acts upon and benefits from a lawful compromise is estopped from withdrawing consent.

The parties were involved in cross-suits concerning land at Survey No. 39, including a disputed 39-guntha parcel. During the suits, they executed a registered family-settlement MOU dated 4 November 2023. Under it, the defendant agreed to execute a relinquishment deed concerning the disputed parcel, while the plaintiff agreed to transfer leasehold rights in Government land at Survey No. 66 paiki to the defendant.

The parties jointly applied for a consent decree on 6 November 2023. The plaintiff’s daughters withdrew related civil suits, and a revenue revision was rejected after the defendant relied on the MOU.

The defendant later sought to withdraw his consent, asserting that the settlement had failed and that the transfer of Government-land leasehold rights was unlawful.

The Trial Court upheld the MOU and granted relief in accordance with it; the first appellate court dismissed the defendant’s appeals. The defendant then filed these second appeals under Section 100 CPC.

1. Whether the registered MOU was a lawful and binding family settlement capable of adjusting the parties’ claims and supporting a consent decree under Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC.

2. Whether the defendant could withdraw his consent after the parties had acted on the MOU, including by withdrawing related suits and relying on it in revenue proceedings.

3. Whether the concurrent decisions disclosed a substantial question of law warranting interference under Section 100 CPC.

Under Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC, the court that records a compromise must determine a dispute over whether the suit has been adjusted by a lawful agreement.

A family settlement may be enforced where it is lawful and the parties have acted upon it; a party who knowingly accepts benefits under a settlement may be estopped from resiling from it, though estoppel cannot override a prohibition of law.

Section 100 CPC limits second appeals to cases involving a substantial question of law; concurrent factual findings are not ordinarily disturbed unless, for example, they are perverse, unsupported by evidence, or contrary to mandatory law.

The Court also considered the appellant’s arguments under Section 23 of the Contract Act but found no basis to treat the settlement as unlawful.

The Court found that the MOU provided for a relinquishment deed—not a sale without consideration—in respect of the 39-guntha parcel, as part of a broader family settlement involving reciprocal arrangements and the parties’ resolution of other disputes.

As to Survey No. 66 paiki, the MOU concerned transfer of leasehold rights, not ownership of Government land; the Court found no material establishing that such rights could not be transferred, and observed that any required permissions or implementing documents could be addressed in execution.

The defendant had signed the registered MOU, jointly sought a consent decree, and obtained benefits after related claims were withdrawn and the MOU was relied upon in revenue proceedings. In the absence of evidence of fraud or coercion, the Court held that he could not resile from the settlement; nor did the 60-day implementation period invalidate it, particularly as the joint application for a decree had been filed within that period.

The concurrent findings disclosed no substantial question of law requiring intervention.

Both appeals were dismissed with costs of ₹50,000 payable by the appellant to the respondent; the judgments and decrees below were confirmed, and the connected civil applications were disposed of.