POCSO presumptions arise only after the prosecution establishes the offence’s foundational facts.

The complainant appealed the acquittal of two accused by the Special (POCSO) Court, Godhra, on charges under Sections 363, 366, 376(2)(n) and 114 IPC and Sections 4, 6 and 12 of the POCSO Act.

The prosecution alleged that accused No. 1 enticed the victim, aged about 16 years and 6 months, took her to Halol, and repeatedly had sexual intercourse with her, while accused No. 2 assisted him.

The trial court found the victim to be a child under the POCSO Act but acquitted the accused, principally because she did not support the prosecution allegations and the other evidence did not establish the charges beyond reasonable doubt.

The complainant challenged that acquittal, arguing that the medical, documentary and witness evidence had been wrongly disregarded.

Whether the trial court’s acquittal was perverse or otherwise warranted appellate interference

Whether the prosecution established the foundational facts necessary to prove the alleged offences and raise the presumptions under Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act, notwithstanding the victim’s evidence

In an appeal against acquittal, the appellate court must respect the reinforced presumption of innocence and should interfere only where compelling circumstances show that the acquittal is perverse; where the trial court’s view is reasonable and possible, a different possible view is insufficient to justify interference (Tulasareddi @ Mudakappa & Anr. v. State of Karnataka & Ors., 2026 INSC 67).

Under Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act, the statutory presumptions arise only after the prosecution establishes the foundational facts of the offence.

A statement under Section 164 CrPC is not substantive evidence and, without being tested in cross-examination, cannot by itself prove the charge.

The victim testified that she had left home because her parents were pressing her to marry, but did not implicate either accused in enticing or taking her, staying with her at Halol, or having sexual intercourse with her.

The court found that the parents were not eyewitnesses, the evidence of PW-7 and PW-8 did not prove the alleged tenancy beyond reasonable doubt, and the medical histories and evidence of hymenal rupture did not independently establish the accused’s involvement.

The panch evidence could not fill the evidentiary gap, and the victim’s Section 164 statement could not substitute for substantive testimony.

Because the prosecution had not established the foundational facts, the POCSO presumptions did not arise; the trial court’s acquittal was a reasonable and possible view.

Finding no perversity or compelling reason to interfere with the acquittal, it dismissed the appeal at the admission stage.