A party’s absence during appeal does not warrant review without an apparent error or other recognized ground.

The petitioner sought review under Section 114 read with Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure of the High Court’s judgment dated 03.09.2026 in MFA No. 6129 of 2024.

In the appeal, the petitioner—who was the respondent—was unrepresented on 08.07.2026 and 03.08.2026, and her counsel was again absent on 11.08.2026, including at the revised call. The Court reserved the matter and later pronounced judgment; the absence was recorded in paragraph 46 of that judgment.

The review petition was instituted on 25.09.2026. At its hearing, the petitioner sought an adjournment to advance arguments.

Whether the review petition disclosed an error apparent on the face of the record or another recognised ground for review under Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC.

Whether the petitioner’s absence during the appeal, and her request for an adjournment at the review hearing, justified reopening the judgment through review.

Section 114 read with Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC permits review only on the limited grounds recognised by law, including an error apparent on the face of the record or discovery of material warranting review.

Review is a corrective jurisdiction, not an appeal or a rehearing; it cannot be used to re-argue matters already decided or to obtain a second opportunity to present arguments.

The Court found that the petitioner had been afforded opportunities to participate in the appeal but had not appeared, and that her absence was expressly recorded in the judgment under review.

The appeal had been reserved and decided by a reasoned judgment, and non-appearance alone did not justify setting that adjudication aside.

The review grounds sought, in substance, to re-examine issues already decided and were appellate in character; the petitioner identified no apparent error or other legally sustainable review ground.

Her request for an adjournment at the review hearing did not expand the Court’s review jurisdiction.

Although it observed that the petition could have warranted exemplary costs, it refrained from imposing costs; there was no order as to costs.