A pending criminal trial does not, by itself, require deferment of disciplinary proceedings.

The petitioner, an Assistant Executive Engineer with the Tamil Nadu Water Supply and Drainage Board (TWAD Board), was arrested in connection with a case alleging manipulation of public examination answer sheets.

A final report was filed, and the criminal case was pending as C.C. No. 355 of 2025 before the Judicial Magistrate No. IV, Madurai.

The petitioner was suspended and later served with a charge memo under Rule 9(b) of the TWAD Board Employees’ (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1972.

He sought to defer the disciplinary proceedings until the criminal trial concluded, arguing that the charges and witnesses overlapped and that disclosing his defence in the enquiry could prejudice his criminal defence.

In separate proceedings concerning his suspension, a Division Bench had directed the disciplinary proceedings to be concluded within 30 days.

1. Whether the disciplinary proceedings should be deferred until conclusion of the pending criminal trial, given the asserted overlap in charges, evidence and witnesses.

2. Whether the Division Bench’s direction to conclude the disciplinary proceedings within 30 days precluded the relief sought in this petition.

Rule 9(b) of the Tamil Nadu Water Supply and Drainage Board Employees’ (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1972, governed the disciplinary charge memo.

The Court referred to G.O. No. 1344, Public (Services-B) Department, dated 16 May 1973, and G.O. (Ms.) No. 66, Human Resources Management (N) Department, dated 6 July 2022, as supporting simultaneous departmental and criminal proceedings.

It relied on Jang Bahadur Singh v. Baij Nath Tiwari, (1969) 1 SCR 134; Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan v. T. Srinivas, (2004) 7 SCC 442; and P. Krishnakumar v. Personnel Assistant (General) to District Collector, Coimbatore, W.A. No. 2728 of 2024, decided 10 September 2024, for the principle that the pendency of a criminal case does not, by itself, bar or require a stay of disciplinary proceedings.

The Court rejected the petitioner’s reliance on the overlap between the disciplinary and criminal cases as a sufficient ground to defer the enquiry.

Applying the principle that both proceedings may generally continue simultaneously, it noted that the charge memo had been issued and an enquiry officer appointed.

It also considered that the Division Bench had directed conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings within 30 days.

In those circumstances, the Court found no basis to halt the enquiry, while preserving the petitioner’s ability to raise his grounds before the Disciplinary Authority.

The petitioner was granted liberty to raise his grounds and pursue his remedy before the Disciplinary Authority, which was expected to comply with the Division Bench’s direction by conducting the enquiry on a day-to-day basis.

No costs were ordered, and the connected miscellaneous petition was closed.

The order also states that the enquiry officer’s presence in the disciplinary proceedings is not warranted if the officer has not been cited as a witness.