A pending Section 152 CPC application does not bar execution of a possession decree.

The respondent obtained a decree for declaration and possession in O.S. No. 4469/2017 on 14 December 2023 and initiated execution proceedings.

In execution, the decree-holder sought permission to break open the lock and obtain police protection for delivery of possession.

The judgment-debtor sought recall of the delivery warrant and adjudication of objections concerning execution, and relied on a pending application under Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), seeking correction of the judgment and decree.

The judgment-debtor’s appeal had been withdrawn, and no stay of the decree was in force.

The Executing Court rejected the applications, prompting this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution.

1. Whether the Executing Court could issue a delivery warrant, permit breaking open the lock, and grant police protection to execute the decree for possession

2. Whether the pending Section 152 CPC application or the judgment-debtor’s execution objections prevented execution of the decree

Section 152 CPC permits correction of clerical or arithmetical mistakes and errors arising from accidental slip or omission; it does not authorise rehearing or reconsideration of issues already decided.

The pendency of a Section 152 application, without an order staying execution, does not by itself bar enforcement of a decree.

A decree for possession may be executed by delivery of possession, including breaking open the lock in accordance with law where necessary; police protection may be sought where execution by the Court Bailiff is resisted.

The Court considered these principles while exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227.

The decree for declaration and possession had attained finality: the appeal had been withdrawn, and the petitioner neither pleaded nor demonstrated any order staying execution.

Since the judgment-debtor resisted or refused to deliver possession, breaking open the lock and obtaining police protection were permissible means of executing the decree.

The objections raised in the execution applications had already been adjudicated in the judgment and decree, and no new ground warranted further adjudication.

The pending Section 152 application could not operate as a bar because that provision is confined to limited corrections and no stay had been granted.

The writ petition was dismissed.