A pending transfer petition or administrative inquiry cannot justify deferring a Section 451 CrPC order.

The applicant, Raman Panwar, lodged FIR No. 0177 of 2022 at Police Station Kankhal, Haridwar, alleging cheating, criminal breach of trust and criminal conspiracy against Rakesh Mehra. During investigation, substantial alleged proceeds of crime were traced to the bank accounts of Mehra’s daughters, Madhavi Arora and Anushka Arora. Approximately ₹31.21 crores were frozen, including ₹10,28,63,336 in Madhavi Arora’s account, ₹12,77,22,000 in Anushka Arora’s account and ₹5,44,45,568 in Rakesh Mehra’s account

Separate applications under Section 451 CrPC seeking release of the frozen/debited amounts were filed before the Judicial Magistrate, Haridwar, on 19 January 2024 and 13 May 2025.

Earlier, the High Court had restrained the Trial Court from passing orders on the release application; however, the Supreme Court set aside that restraint on 6 May 2025 and directed that the Section 451 CrPC application be decided in accordance with law.

The Trial Court heard the parties on 15 July 2026 and fixed 22 July 2026 for orders.

On 22 July 2026, instead of pronouncing the order, it deferred the matter on the ground that the High Court had sought comments/narratives from it in pending transfer applications filed by the accused, namely Transfer Applications Nos. 22 and 29 of 2025.

The applicant challenged the deferment orders under Section 528 BNSS.

The High Court noted that there was no judicial stay of the Trial Court proceedings in the transfer applications and that the accused had only been permitted to seek adjournment. It further noted that previous challenges to the criminal proceedings had been dismissed and that the Supreme Court had dismissed the related SLP on 9 July 2026.

1. Whether the Trial Court was justified in deferring pronouncement of its order on the applications under Section 451 CrPC merely because the High Court had sought administrative comments/narratives in pending transfer applications?

2. Whether the pendency of transfer applications, in the absence of any specific judicial order staying the proceedings, permitted the Trial Court to withhold compliance with the Supreme Court’s direction dated 6 May 2025 to decide the Section 451 CrPC application in accordance with law?

The Court applied Section 451 CrPC, which empowers the criminal court to pass appropriate orders regarding the custody and disposal of property involved in a criminal proceeding, and Section 528 BNSS, under which the High Court entertained the challenge to the Trial Court’s deferment orders.

It relied principally on the Supreme Court’s order dated 6 May 2025 in Criminal Appeal No. 2525 of 2025, which set aside the restraint on the Trial Court and directed that the application under Section 451 CrPC be decided in accordance with law.

The Court further applied the principles of judicial discipline and the binding nature of Supreme Court directions, holding that a subordinate court cannot disregard or delay compliance with such directions.

A pending transfer application does not automatically stay proceedings; absent a specific judicial stay, the Trial Court remains bound to continue with the matter.

Administrative communications seeking comments are distinct from judicial orders staying proceedings and cannot override the Supreme Court’s mandate.

The Supreme Court had expressly removed the earlier restraint and directed the Trial Court to decide the Section 451 CrPC application in accordance with law.

The Trial Court thereafter heard the parties and fixed the matter for pronouncement, but deferred the order solely because the High Court had sought comments in pending transfer applications.

The High Court held that seeking comments on the administrative side did not amount to a stay or direction to defer the Section 451 proceedings. Since no judicial order had restrained the Trial Court, the pendency of the transfer applications could not justify withholding the order.

The Court also emphasised that the transfer applications had been pending since 2025 and that the allegations of bias had not previously prevented the continuation of proceedings; in any event, such allegations could not override the specific direction of the Supreme Court.

By deferring pronouncement, the Trial Court had improperly conflated an administrative request for comments with a judicial suspension of proceedings and had failed to maintain judicial discipline.

The Trial Court was directed to proceed with and pronounce its order, in continuation of its order dated 15 July 2026, strictly in accordance with the Supreme Court’s judgment dated 6 May 2025, within two weeks from the date of presentation of a copy of the High Court’s order.

A copy of the judgment was directed to be transmitted to the Trial Court immediately for compliance.