A person claiming possession through an existing defendant is neither a necessary nor proper party.

Respondents 1–5 instituted Civil Suit No. 3/A/2022 seeking declaration of title, permanent injunction, possession, and a declaration that the Will Deeds dated 16 August 2017 and 11 June 2018 were null and void.

The petitioner, Sanjay Kumar Agrawal, was not impleaded in the suit. He claimed to be in possession and cultivation of the suit land under an agreement dated 21 February 2021 executed by defendant No. 1, Pranadhar Agrawal; he asserted that his presence was necessary because of his physical possession of the property. The trial court rejected his application under Order I Rule 10 CPC, holding that he claimed through defendant No. 1, who was already a party, had filed a written statement and counterclaim, and was properly contesting the suit. The petitioner challenged that order under Article 227 of the Constitution.

Whether a person claiming possession of the suit property solely through an existing defendant under a cultivation agreement is a necessary or proper party under Order I Rule 10(2) CPC?

Whether the trial court committed a jurisdictional error or perversity in refusing to implead the petitioner as a defendant?

The Court applied Order I Rule 10(2) CPC, which permits the addition of a person who ought to have been joined or whose presence is necessary for the effective and complete adjudication of all questions involved in the suit. Relying on Mumbai International Airport Pvt. Ltd. v. Regency Convention Centre & Hotels Pvt. Ltd., (2010) 7 SCC 417, the Court reiterated that although the plaintiff is ordinarily dominus litis, this principle is subject to the court’s power to implead necessary or proper parties.

Relying further on Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, (1992) 2 SCC 524, the Court stated that a necessary party is one without whom no effective order can be made, while a proper party is one whose presence is necessary for a complete and final adjudication, even though an effective order may be made in that party’s absence.

The Court found that the petitioner claimed no independent title or legal interest in the suit property. His alleged possession arose only from the cultivation agreement executed by defendant No. 1, through whom he claimed. Since defendant No. 1 was already a party, had filed a written statement and counterclaim, and was actively defending the suit, the petitioner was effectively claiming through an existing defendant and could not be treated as a necessary party merely because he was allegedly in physical possession on that defendant’s behalf.

The petitioner’s contractual or cultivation-related rights, if any, were distinct from the questions concerning title, validity of the Wills, injunction and possession between the plaintiffs and the existing defendants. His presence was therefore not required either to pass an effective decree or to completely adjudicate the issues in the suit. The trial court’s refusal to implead him did not disclose any jurisdictional error or perversity.

Finding no ground for interference under Article 227 of the Constitution, the Court dismissed the writ petition and affirmed the trial court’s order dated 3 July 2026 rejecting the impleadment application.