A plaint cannot be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 where limitation raises triable issues.

The appellant-plaintiff instituted a suit concerning premises no. 2/1, Loudon Street, Kolkata, seeking declarations that a registered deed of gift dated 1 August 1948 and other documents of title were false, fabricated, ineffective, and did not create or transfer any title or interest in the suit property, along with consequential reliefs concerning delivery of documents and perpetual injunction.

The appellant claimed title under a deed of conveyance dated 8 March 2011, executed by defendant no. 26, who had acquired the property from Aparna Singh under a conveyance dated 15 July 2005. The appellant pleaded that it first became aware of the rival claims and the deed of gift on 29 October 2013, when it was served with the plaint in CS No. 371 of 2013.

The plaint was presented on 18 March 2016, whereas leave under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent, 1865 was granted on 2 January 2023. The learned Single Judge rejected the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, holding, inter alia, that the suit disclosed no sustainable cause of action and appeared to be barred by limitation. The plaintiff appealed.

1. Whether the plaint was instituted on 18 March 2016, when it was presented before the Centralized Filing Section, notwithstanding that leave under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent was granted only on 2 January 2023?

2. Whether, on a meaningful reading of the plaint and the documents annexed to it, the suit was liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(a) of the CPC for failure to disclose a cause of action?

3. Whether the suit was ex facie barred by limitation under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC, particularly in view of Section 3 and Explanations I and II of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and the defendants’ contention that the appellant had earlier constructive or actual notice of the rival title?

Section 26 and Order IV Rule 1 of the CPC provide that a suit is instituted by presentation of the plaint to the Court or its designated officer.

Chapter XXXIXA Rules 1 and 3 of the Calcutta High Court Original Side Rules permit presentation of a complete plaint before the Centralized Filing Section, notwithstanding contrary provisions elsewhere in the Rules; consequently, limitation stops running upon such presentation.

Under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) of the CPC, a plaint may be rejected where it discloses no cause of action or where the suit appears from the plaint itself to be barred by law. The court must ordinarily consider the plaint as a whole, accept its pleaded facts as true, and disregard the defence at that stage, as recognised in Chhotanben v. Kiritbhai Jalkrushna Bhai Thakkar, Daliben Valjibhai v. Prajapati Kodarbhai, B.S. Lalitha v. Bhuvanesh, and Liverpool & London S.P. & I Association Ltd. v. M.V. Sea Success I.

However, rejection is permissible where limitation is conclusively apparent from the plaint and annexures, as explained in Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle and N. Asha Devi v. R. Aravind Kumar.

Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, including Explanations I and II, concerns constructive notice arising from registered instruments and actual possession; whether its conditions are satisfied generally involves questions of fact requiring evidence.

The Court held that the plaint was presented on 18 March 2016 before the Centralized Filing Section. Applying Chapter XXXIXA Rules 1 and 3 of the Original Side Rules, read harmoniously with Chapter VII Rule 4 and Order IV Rule 1 of the CPC, the Court treated that date as the date of institution; the later grant of Clause 12 leave did not create a fresh institution date or establish abuse of process.

On limitation, the plaint expressly pleaded that the appellant discovered the rival claims only on 29 October 2013. Although the defendants relied on earlier registered documents, the deed of lease, the prior transactions, the alleged knowledge of the plaintiff’s director, and the doctrine of constructive notice under Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, those matters did not conclusively establish prior knowledge from the plaint alone.

The applicability of Explanations I and II, including whether the statutory conditions for constructive notice or actual possession existed at the relevant time, required evidentiary determination. Since the plaint disclosed a cause of action and limitation remained a triable mixed question of fact and law, Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) could not be invoked.

The issue of limitation was expressly kept open for determination at trial. The appeal was disposed of without any order as to costs.