A plaintiff must prove continuous readiness and willingness to obtain specific performance.

The plaintiff sought specific performance of a sale agreement dated 20 December 1999, under which the defendants allegedly agreed to sell the suit property for ₹1,50,000 and received ₹1,00,000 as advance.

The defendants disputed the sale agreement, asserting that the transaction was a ₹15,000 loan and that their signatures had been taken on blank stamp paper.

The Trial Court accepted the plaintiff’s evidence of execution and payment, but declined specific performance under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, and instead ordered repayment of ₹1,00,000 with interest at 18% per annum.

On the plaintiff’s appeal, the First Appellate Court granted specific performance and directed the defendants to execute a sale deed, demolishing the structure on the property if necessary.

The defendants appealed under Section 100 CPC.

1. Whether the First Appellate Court’s points for determination and reasons complied with Order XLI Rule 31 CPC.

2. Whether the First Appellate Court was justified in granting specific performance on the evidence on record.

3. Whether the First Appellate Court was justified in reversing the Trial Court’s exercise of discretion under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.

4. Whether the plaintiff had established continuous readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract, as required by Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.

Under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, a plaintiff seeking specific performance must aver and prove continuous readiness and willingness to perform the essential terms of the contract from the agreement through the relevant proceedings.

Under Section 20, as applicable to this dispute, specific performance was discretionary and the discretion had to be exercised on sound judicial principles, including consideration of comparative hardship.

In a second appeal under Section 100 CPC, the High Court may interfere where the First Appellate Court’s decision raises a substantial question of law; Order XLI Rule 31 requires the appellate court to frame points for determination and give reasons for its decision.

The High Court held that the First Appellate Court had not properly assessed the Trial Court’s reasoned exercise of discretion under Section 20, including the evidence that the defendants constructed a house on the property during the suit and the Trial Court’s finding that specific performance would cause them comparative hardship.

The Court also found that the plaintiff had not shown continuous readiness and willingness: although the agreement was dated 20 December 1999, he issued notice only on 1 September 2002, provided no adequate explanation for the intervening inaction, and produced no evidence of funds or capacity to raise them for the relevant period; the bank passbook relied upon covered a later period.

The Trial Court’s finding on readiness and willingness therefore could not stand, and the First Appellate Court’s decree granting specific performance was unsustainable.

It set aside the First Appellate Court’s judgment and decree dated 16 September 2017 and restored the Trial Court’s judgment and decree dated 2 December 2015, including the order requiring repayment of the ₹1,00,000 advance with interest at 18% per annum from 20 December 1999 until realization.