A pleaded threat to transfer property can disclose refusal and defeat rejection of a specific-performance plaint.

The plaintiff filed a suit for specific performance and permanent injunction on 5 October 2016, relying on a registered agreement to sell dated 8 May 2015 for a plot allotted to the original defendants by the U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad.

The agreement contemplated execution of a sale deed within six months after the Parishad executed its deed in favour of the original defendants.

The plaintiff alleged part-payment, readiness and willingness to perform, and that on 3 October 2016 he learned that the original defendants intended to transfer the plot to others.

The revisionists, who later purchased the plot under a sale deed dated 23 November 2016 and were impleaded as defendants, applied under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. The trial court rejected their application; they challenged that order in revision.

Whether the plaint disclosed a cause of action for specific performance and injunction, or was liable to rejection under Order VII Rule 11(a) CPC

Whether the suit was premature or appeared, on the plaint’s statements, to be barred by limitation under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC

Order VII Rule 11(a) CPC requires rejection where the plaint does not disclose a cause of action; Rule 11(d) applies where the plaint’s own statements show that the suit is barred by law.

The inquiry is ordinarily confined to the plaint read as a whole, and disputed questions or the defendant’s case are not to be determined at this stage (Madanuri Sri Rama Chandra Murthy v. Syed Jalal; Srihari Hanumandas Totala v. Hemant Vithal Kamat).

Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963 prescribes three years for a specific-performance suit, running from the date fixed for performance or, if no such date is fixed, from when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused. A “date fixed” must be definite and crystallised (Ahmadsahab Abdul Mulla v. Bibijan).

A suit that is premature is not necessarily liable to dismissal at the threshold; prematurity does not, by itself, go to the court’s jurisdiction (Vithalbhai (P) Ltd. v. Union Bank of India; Virgo Industries (Eng.) Pvt. Ltd. v. Venturetech Solutions Pvt. Ltd.).

The Court read the plaint and agreement as a whole. Although the agreement linked performance to the Parishad’s execution of a sale deed and provided a six-month period thereafter, the Court found no fixed calendar date for performance.

It therefore applied the second limb of Article 54.

The plaint alleged that the plaintiff received information on 3 October 2016 that the original defendants intended to transfer the property to third parties, and that he had previously issued notices seeking performance.

Those pleaded facts disclosed a threatened refusal and a cause of action for the reliefs claimed; whether the agreement was enforceable, or whether the Specific Relief Act otherwise affected the plaintiff’s entitlement, was left for trial.

The plaint did not, on its face, establish a limitation bar. The Court accordingly held that the asserted prematurity did not warrant rejection under Order VII Rule 11.

It found no ground to interfere with the trial court’s rejection of the Order VII Rule 11 application and dismissed the revision petition.