A POCSO conviction cannot rest on inconsistent child testimony and inconclusive medical evidence.

The appellant challenged his conviction under Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (“POCSO Act”) and sentence of rigorous imprisonment for the remainder of his natural life, with a fine of ₹50,000, imposed by the Special Judge, POCSO, North Salmara, Abhayapuri, in Special (POCSO) Case No. 22(A) of 2021.

The prosecution alleged that on 17 September 2019, while the five-year-old victim was being carried by her grandmother, the appellant took the child in his arms and inserted his finger into her private part, causing her to cry.

The FIR was lodged on 19 September 2019, and the appellant was initially charged under Section 4 of the POCSO Act; the charge was subsequently altered to Section 6.

The Trial Court relied principally on the testimony of the victim and her grandmother, the medical finding of an inflamed vaginal orifice, and the appellant’s statement under Section 313 CrPC that he had met the victim and her grandmother on the relevant evening.

In appeal, the appellant contended that the prosecution evidence contained material contradictions, that the victim had been tutored, and that the medical evidence was inconclusive.

1. Whether the testimony of the victim was sufficiently consistent and reliable to qualify as that of a “sterling witness” and sustain conviction without independent corroboration?

2. Whether the evidence of the grandmother, the victim’s parents, and the medical officer materially corroborated the allegation that the appellant had committed penetrative sexual assault?

3. Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant’s act fell within Section 3(b), constituting aggravated penetrative sexual assault under Section 5(m), punishable under Section 6 of the POCSO Act?

The Court applied Section 3(b) of the POCSO Act, which treats insertion of any object or part of the body, other than the penis, into a child’s vagina, urethra, or anus as penetrative sexual assault.

Since the victim was below twelve years of age, such assault would constitute aggravated penetrative sexual assault under Section 5(m), punishable under Section 6.

The Court reiterated that the testimony of a prosecutrix in a sexual-offence case may, by itself, support conviction, but only where it inspires confidence and is consistent and truthful.

Relying on Rai Sandeep v. State of NCT of Delhi , (2012) 8 SCC 21, it held that a “sterling witness” must provide a consistent, natural, and unassailable account capable of withstanding cross-examination and cohering with other material evidence.

Where the prosecutrix’s testimony does not inspire confidence, corroboration must be sought from the remaining evidence.

The prosecution also bore the burden of proving the charge beyond reasonable doubt.

The Court found material inconsistencies in the victim’s accounts.

In her statement under Section 161 CrPC, she stated that a man had put his finger on her private part; before the Magistrate under Section 164 CrPC, she stated that he inserted his finger into her genitals; and before the Trial Court, she attributed the act specifically to “Dilip Das” and referred to insertion into her “nunu”.

Although the Court accepted that a child might not distinguish precisely between anatomical terms, it considered the change from “a man” to the appellant’s name, the different descriptions of the act, and the victim’s admission that her grandmother had taught her what to say in Court to be significant doubts affecting her reliability.

The victim also gave differing accounts regarding whether the grandmother had actually witnessed the penetration, while the grandmother’s testimony that the victim’s father arrived during the occurrence and caused the appellant to flee was contradicted by the father’s evidence and by the grandmother’s police statement.

The medical evidence did not conclusively establish penetration: the doctor found an inflamed vaginal orifice, but the hymen was intact and there were no bodily injuries; inflammation could also result from infection, itching, friction, or playing outside without undergarments.

The Court therefore held that the evidence did not reliably prove insertion of the appellant’s finger into the victim’s private part, as required under Section 3(b), and that the prosecution had failed to eliminate reasonable doubt regarding both the occurrence and the appellant’s involvement.

It directed that he be released forthwith unless required in any other case.

The Court further directed the Legal Services Authority to pay appropriate remuneration to the amicus curiae and ordered that the Trial Court Records be returned.